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BAHUARA STEELE 
CLERK OF TH\J?~T 
OEPUT~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON-
BROWN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 
GREENHEART, an individual, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-353 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
DIRECTIONS FOR ENTRY OF 
JUDGMENT 
THIS MATTER was heard as a court trial on March 5 and 6, 2013. Thomas E. Dvorak 
appeared representing the Plaintiffs and the Defendant was represented by Joseph Borton and 
Victor Villegas. Numerous exhibits were admitted by the court and Plaintiff Jay Brown, 
Defendant Augusta Greenheart, and Plaintiff Christine Brown testified. The Defendant's 
exhibits had previously been admitted as Plaintiff's exhibits, so this decision uses the Plaintiff's 
designations. The parties presented oral closing arguments but the Court allowed the parties 
until April 8, 2013, to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court now 
enters the following Decision on Court Trial that constitutes Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). 
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This action was initiated by Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (the 
"Browns") on April 5, 2012. The Browns assert two causes of action against Defendant Augusta 
Sayoko Mimoto Greenheart ("Dr. Greenheart") in the Complaint to Quiet Title. Each asks the 
court to Quiet Title and enter a Declaratory Judgment relating to water rights owned by the 
Browns which Dr. Greenheart claims were passed to her under the general appurtenancy clause 
of the Warranty Deed when she purchased the land from the Browns. Count 1 requests a 
declaratory judgment on contract interpretation. Count 2 requests a declaratory judgment under 
the principles of promissory estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and/or waiver. 
In its January 31, 2013 decision on cross motions for summary judgment, this Court 
granted in part and denied in part, ruling "the matters presented by both sides in support of the 
motions for summary judgment raise the issue of whether there was a mistake which is a 
question of fact that precludes summary judgment." Order at p. 10. The Plaintiffs' Motion to 
file an Amended Complaint was denied at the pretrial conference on February 22, 2013. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about February 5, 1988 Jay Brown acquired a parcel of approximately 320 acres 
of land situated in the East Yi of Section 24, Township 4 South, Range 5 East in Elmore County, 
Idaho ("Original Brown Property") by way of a Quitclaim Deed. 
2. The Snake River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA") Court in Twin Falls, Idaho, decreed 
Water Rights Nos. 61-2188 with a priority date of February 17, 1966 and 61-7151 with a priority 
date of April 9, 1973 (the "Water Rights") to Jay Brown on October 26, 2000. 
3. Water Right No. 61-2188 was decreed authorizing the irrigation of up to 164 acres of 
land within a permissible place of use that encompassed the 320 acres comprising the Original 
Brown Property. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DIRECTIONS FOR ENTRY OF 
JUDGMENT 2 
538 
4. Water Right No. 61-7151 was decreed authorizing the irrigation of up to 123 acres of 
land within a permissible place of use that encompassed the 320 acres comprising the Original 
Brown Property. 
5. As dee~ the Water Rights in 3. and 4. above could be used together to irrigate no 
more than 287 acres within the combined total 320 acres in the Original Brown Property in a 
single irrigation season. 
6. Neither of the Water Rights have been used to irrigate any portion of the Greenheart 
Property since at least 1986. 
7. On August 28, 2003, the Browns leased portions of the Water Rights appurtenant to 
160 acres of the Original Brown Property to the Idaho Water Resource Board ("IWRB") Water 
Supply Bank. Pursuant to that lease, the Browns contracted with the IWRB to idle 160 acres of 
the 287 authorized acres from irrigation. The Water Supply Bank lease remained in effect on the 
date of trial. The water rights could not be used while in the bank. 
8. In the middle of2006, Mr. Brown contracted to sell 272 acres of the Water Rights 
alone for $1,450.00 per acre to Idaho Water Company. This written and signed contract 
continued from mid-2006 until 2009. The buyer did not perform on this contract and the 
contract was terminated in 2009. 
9. In December 2006, the Browns listed 60 acres of the Original Brown Property for sale 
with an asking price of $80,000.00. The property was listed for sale through a real estate agent, 
Daryl Rhead. 
11. The sixty acres listed were not previously irrigated by the Browns by either 
handlines before 2007 (irrigated portion depicted in Plaintiff's Exhibit 46) or center pivot after 
2007 (irrigated portion depicted in Plaintiff's Exhibit 44). The sixty acres listed for sale are 
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depicted within the yellow rectangle on Plaintiff's Exhibit 45 and did not have any apparatus to 
apply irrigation water since 1988 or at the time of the listing for sale. 
12. Mr. Brown told Mr. Rhead that the tenns of the listing were to be dry ground with no 
water rights since it was not Mr. Brown's intent to transfer the water rights with the real estate at 
the time of the sale. 
13. The broker's listing shown in Plaintiff's Exhibit S did not have any information 
under "Irrigation?," "Irrigation Dist?," "Irrig Dist Name," or "Irrigation type." Under the listing 
of features, "Water'' was listed as "Proposed Well." 
14. Mr. Brown testified that his understanding of Plaintiff's Exhibit S was that no 
irrigation system, watershares, or water rights were available for pmchase as part of this listing. 
15. Augusta Greenheart wanted to invest in real estate in the Mountain Home area. 
16. Ms. Green testified that she had come to the United States from Japan as a 
teenager; had attended school in the United States including obtaining four college degrees 
including a Master of Arts in Teaching and a Doctorate in Education. She considers English her 
primary language and has taught English for many years although she still speaks with a 
Japanese accent. In the courtroom, she clearly had a command of the English language and was 
able to communicate effectively with the court and counsel. 
17. In 2006, Ms. Green spoke with Mr. Rhead about her interest in pmchasing vacant 
acres in the Mountain Home area Mr. Rhead later called to tell her of sixty acres that were 
available for pmchase for $80,000.00. Ms. Greenheart discussed with Mr. Rhead that she 
wanted vacant land with low taxes and low maintenance. 
18. All communications between Plaintiffs and Ms. Greenheart at all times 
throughout the negotiation and sale were through Mr. Rhead, the real estate agent. Mr. Rhead 




was both the listing and the selling agent for this agreement Mr. Rhead did not testify at the 
trial. 
19. Ms. Greenheart saw Plaintiff's Exhibit S, the broker's listing, before the sale. 
She said she thought that "Proposed Well" meant that someone had proposed a well and that if 
she purchased the land, she may get a well. She testified that it did not say irrigation was 
restricted or that the land did not have one so she "was okay" with the possibility of getting one. 
20. Ms. Oreenheart stated she asked Mr. Rhead some questions about the property 
and after he described it to her, she made an offer within about three days to purchase the 
property without looking at or inspecting the property. She stated she asked Mr. Rhead "if there 
was any water coming through" and she stated all she could remember of the response was "it is 
dry.,, She thought she asked him if she could dig a well and he responded yes, but she said there 
was no discussion of actually digging a well because at that time she knew that it was not cheap 
to dig a well. She testified that Mr. Rhead did not tell her the property had a water right, "he said 
it was dry.,, She also testified that in 2007, she did not think she had to have a decreed water 
right to dig a well. 
21. Ms. Oreenheart testified that at the time of the negotiation and sale of the 
property, she thought "dry" when used by Mr. Rhead meant "dry." She said that at that time, she 
thought this meant there was no surface water across the property. She said that in her 
conversations with Mr. Rhe~ they did not differentiate between the terms surface water or 
water right. 
22. Ms. Greenheart testified at trial that she owned several other properties including 
a house in Japan, two properties in Alaska, two properties in Nevada, and another property in 
Emmett, Idaho. She testified that she had first heard the term water right in conjunction with her 
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property in Emmett which she had purchased prior to negotiating on the Mountain Home 
property. She testified with the property in Emmett she had received shares of water through an 
irrigation district and considered a water right as water running through the land. She had not 
made statements in her earlier affidavit filed in this case or in her deposition about the Emmett 
property or how that influenced her understanding in this case. She later testified in this case that 
she did not remember what she understood water rights to mean in 2007. 
23. Ms. Greenheart testified that she understood irrigation to mean water artificially 
brought to the land and knew of center pivot irrigation systems before 2007. 
24. Ms. Greenheart was not told at any time before closing of the property that there 
were Water Rights associated with the 320 acre property adjudicated and decreed by the Snake 
River Basin Adjudication. 
25. Ms. Greenheart submitted an offer on January 4, 2007 by way of Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 6, a "Vacant Land Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement." She offered to purchase 
the property from the Browns for $76,000.00 under the terms in this agreement. 
26. Ms. Greenheart explained her understanding of the agreement at the time it was 
made. She acknowledged under paragraph 23 that it was the entire agreement. She 
acknowledged that paragraph 6 "strongly advised" her to inspect the property but she chose not 
to have an inspection. She acknowledged paragraph 5 and said her definition of not applicable 
or NA was that it was "not applicable." 
27. Paragraph 6.E. states under "Utilities, Improvements & Other Rights" that "Seller 
represents that the property does have the following utilities, improvements, services and other 
rights available (describe availability):" and that NIA was specifically entered into the 
agreement. 




28. Paragraph 16 of the agreement states, 
16. WATER RIGHTS: Description of water rights, water systems, wells, springs, water, 
ditches, ditch rights, etc., if any, that are appurtenant thereto that are now on or used in 
connection with the premises and shall be included in the sale unless otherwise provided 
herein: [left blank]. 
29. Mr. Brown testified that nothing was listed in paragraph 16 after the colon so he 
believed it meant that there was nothing "as far as water rights go" since there was nothing listed 
at this point in the agreement. 
30. Ms. Greenheart explained her understanding of this agreement was that it did not 
mention that water was excluded. She said that unless she saw "limited to" or "excluded," then 
she assumed it was included. 
31. In the purchase and sale agreement, there was also a box allocating which party 
would pay the water rights transfer fee and the "X'' was placed in the box for not applicable. 
32. The purchase and sale agreement was accompanied by a Seller's Property 
Disclosure Form, Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, which Ms. Greenheart testified she probably saw prior to 
purchase. Under the disclosure entitled, "Irrigation water provided by:," there also appeared 
"NI A" for not applicable. 
33. Both Jay and Christine Brown testified that they reviewed the terms of the 
Purchase and Sale Agreement before entering into the agreement. 
34. The Browns counteroffered for the full $80,000.00 purchase price by way of the 
RE-13 Counteroffer, the last page of Plaintiff's Exhibit 6. Ms. Greenheart accepted the 
counteroffer. The purchase price represents $1,333.33 per acre ofland. 
35. Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. A contract term is 
ambiguous when there are two different reasonable interpretations or the language is 
nonsensical. Swanson v. Beco Constr. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 62, 175 P.3d 748, 751 (2007). This 




court finds as a matter of law that the language of the Purchase and Sale Agreement is subject to 
two different reasonable interpretations. Therefore, interpreting an ambiguous term is an issue of 
fact. Ba/c/cer v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, L.L.C., 141 Idaho 185, 190, 108 P.3d 332, 337 (2005). 
Ambiguities can be either patent or latent. Idaho courts look solely to the face of a written 
agreement to determine whether it is [patently] ambiguous while a latent ambiguity is not evident 
on the face of the instrument alone, but becomes apparent when applying the instrument to the 
facts as they exist. Ward v. Puregro Co., 128 Idaho 366, 369, 913 P.2d 582, 585 (1996); Accord, 
Valley Bank v. Christensen, 119 Idaho 496, 808 P .2d 415 ( 1991 ); In re Estate of Kirlc, 121 Idaho 
817' 824, 907 p .2d 794, 801 ( 1995). 
Regarding the Purchase and Sale Agreement, neither party is entitled to any presumption 
against the drafter. The court has looked at the face of the document and given the words or 
phrases used their established definitions in common use or settled legal meanings. The Court 
listened to the testimony of each witness and observed each witness's demeanor while testifying. 
I find as a fact that the language of the Purchase and Sale Agreement is ambiguous. More 
specifically, Paragraph 16 is ambiguous because of the placement of a colon at the end of the 
sentence rather than a period. Mr. Brown contends "herein:" meant "herein within this 
document" and subject to the interpretation of other paragraphs. Ms. Greenheart contends 
"herein:" meant "herein within this paragraph." Both interpretations are reasonable even 
applying the common meanings of these words and Paragraph 16 is ambiguous. Since the 
language of the contract is ambiguous the court found extrinsic evidence of the contracting 
parties' intent relevant. Related to the parties' intent, the court also found the subsequent 
statements of Ms. Greenheart relevant for impeaching her statement that she did not understand 
in 2007 that she did not have water rights. 
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13. In reading the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the court reads Paragraph 16 in 
conjunction with other parts of the document, including Paragraph 6.E. and the costs box, and 
finds as a matter of fact that the Water Rights and any irrigation system were excluded by listing 
an abbreviation for "not applicable" in Paragraph 6.E. Paragraph 6.E. states, "Seller represents 
that the property does have the following utilities, improvements, services and other rights 
available (describe availability): N/ A." Although such information could have been repeated 
again after the colon in Paragraph 16, it was not, which Ms. Greenheart testified caused 
confusion. Paragraph 16 did not specifically exclude an irrigation system or Water Rights 
although they were excluded by exception earlier in the agreement. Therefore, the court looked 
to the previous information and course of conduct of the parties in determining the parties' intent 
in this agreement. The broker's listing agreement which Ms. Greenheart testified she had seen 
prior to the offer indicates there were no water rights or irrigation system with the property (other 
than a proposed well, discussed below). Ms. Greenheart testified she was told by Mr. Rhead that 
the property was "dry" and understood that to mean "dry." As to other explanations offered at 
trial by Ms. Greenheart, the court finds her credibility was impeached by her subsequent 
statements to Elmore County offices about her understanding that she had no water rights. I find 
as a fact that at the time of the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the Browns intended to sell 80 
acres of land without its proportionate appurtenant Water Rights and Ms. Greenheart intended to 
purchase 80 acres of"dry" land without appurtenant Water Rights other than either an existing 
well on the property or the ability to drill a well. 
14. In January of 2007, Ms. Greenheart purchased approximately sixty ( 60) acres of 
the Original Brown Property from the Browns, leaving the Browns with approximately 260 acres 
(the "Current Brown Property''). 




15. A Warranty Deed, Plaintifrs Exhibit 8, was signed on January 29, 2007 by the 
Plaintiffs stating 
Jay B. Brown and Christine M. Hopson-Bro~ husband and wife 
GRANTOR(S) do( es) hereby GRANT, BARGAIN, SELL and CONVEY unto 
Augusta Sayoko D. Mimoto Greenheart, a single woman, GRANTEE(S) 
The following described real property in Elmore County, Idaho to wit [legal 
description] SA VE AND EXCEPT that portion [deeded as a right-of-way]. 
Subject to: taxes, easements and restrictions of record. 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD said premises, with their appurtenances unto the said 
Grantee and to the Grantee's heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does 
hereby covenant to and with the said Grantee, that the Grantor is the owner in fee 
simple of said premises; that they are free from all encumbrances except as 
described above and that Grantor will warrant and defend the same from all 
lawful claims whatsoever. 
The Warranty Deed was recorded in Elmore County on January 30, 2007 as Instrument# 
384017. 
16. The Warranty Deed was prepared by First American Title. The closing escrow fee 
included the preparation and recording of the deed was shared equally by the Plaintiffs and the 
Defendant under Paragraph 21 of the Purchase and Sale Agreement and testimony at trial. 
Plaintiffs Exhibits 9 and 10 reflect that the settlement or closing fee was split equally between 
both parties. Neither party is entitled to a presumption against the drafter of the deed. 
17. The Browns reviewed the Warranty Deed before signing it. 
18. In determining the credibility of Ms. Greenheart's testimony at trial, the court 
considered her subsequent statements for impeachment purposes under Idaho Rule of Evidence 
607. Additionally, the court considered these later statements substantively as proof for Count 2. 
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19. Ms. Greenheart submitted a June 10, 2007 Notice of Appeal to the Elmore County 
Board of Equalization ("Board") for the Greenheart Property wherein Dr. Greenheart challenged 
the classification of the Greenheart Property as irrigated agriculture. She sought to have it 
reclassified as dry grazing. In both a July 2, 2007 letter admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit 21 and a 
July 10, 2007 Notice of Appeal admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit 17, Ms. Greenheart wrote and 
signed statements to the assessor's office saying she purchased 60 acres from Mr. Jay Brown. 
Both letters say, "At the time of purchase, I was told that the land is dry and [the] grass that 
grows is good for cattle and there is no structure of any kind; therefore, the tax will be minimal. 
I was very surprised when I received the year 2007 tax assessment." 
20. Neither Jay Brown nor Augusta Greenheart testified at trial that they believed the 
reclassification of the property to irrigated agriculture was correct. 
21. Ms. Greenheart asked Jay Brown to assist her with the appeal and submitted a 
written authorization to the Board for Mr. Brown to represent her before the Board. On July 6, 
2007, Jay Brown appeared before the Board and represented that the Greenheart Property was 
dry land. Ms. Greenheart acknowledged at trial that she had asked for and appreciated Mr. 
Brown's help before the Board. Mr. Brown submitted a letter he drafted at Ms. Greenheart's 
request to the Elmore County Board of Tax Equalization. The letter was also copied to Ms. 
Greenheart. Specifically, in Plaintiff's Exhibit 16 he indicated: "The property referenced, has 
no water right with the Idaho Water Resources. It was strictly for dry grazing. Ms. Greenheart's 
tax levy indicates that the property is irrigated; however, the property is not and will not be 
irrigated unless at such time a water right is purchased for the property by Ms. Greenheart." 
22. Mr. Brown testified that at the time of this statement, he did not believe that any 
water right had been transferred with the Greenheart property. 




23. At this time, Mr. Brown also signed a dry grazing lease at Ms. Greenheart's 
request to help her reduce her taxes on the property by, having the property reclassified as dry 
grazing. Ms. Greenheart actually drafted this dry grazing lease by downloading a Word version 
of an apartment lease off the Internet and then modifying it herself into a dry grazing lease. In 
drafting the lease, she specifically provided that lessee shall not use the leased premised for any 
other purpose other than dry grazing. The lease was backdated. 
24. As a result of these documents and efforts by both Mr. Brown and Ms. 
Greenheart, the Board granted Ms. Greenheart's request on July 6, 2007 and "an adjustment 
[was] made back to dry grazing ... " on the Greenheart Property according to Plaintiff's Exhibit 
22. The 2008 Assessment Notice reflected the change to Category 5 Dry Grazing and resulted in 
an annual reduction of$600.00 in real estate taxes on the Greenheart property. 
25. Later, a dispute developed between the Browns and the County over the split of 
the Greenheart Property. Elmore County made an offer to Ms. Greenheart to purchase the 
Greenheart Property. In a November 8, 2009 e-mail to an Elmore County employee concerning 
Elmore County's offer to purchase the Greenheart Property, Ms. Greenheart stated "At the time 
of my purchase, I was very aware that my parcel is strictly for farming and that I had no way to 
build a residence. Again, at the time of the purchase, I also was very aware that the parcel is dry 
grazing only due to lack of an irrigation system and no water rights." Plaintiff's Exhibit 28. She 
declined to sell the property at that time at the offered price although the e-mail reflected she 
would consider selling in the future at a higher price. The offered amount was not in evidence. 
26. In February 2012, the Browns were contemplating one or more sales or transfers 
of Water Rights 61-2188 and 61-7151. The Browns had an offer from the City of Mountain 
Home to purchase their water rights for $2,000 per acre. The Browns spoke with attorney 




Michael Creamer regarding the potential sale and learned that the reference to "appurtenances" 
in a deed may have included the water rights. 
27. On February 8, 2012, Jay Brown contacted Ms. Greenheart by telephone to 
discuss the Water Rights. Ms. Greenheart testified that during the conversation, Mr. Brown 
indicated he had ~'mistakenly sold the groundwater right to her." 
28. After the telephone call, on February 17, 2012 Ms. Greenheart filed with IDWR a 
Notice of Change of Water Right Ownership where Ms. Greenheart stated the Water Rights were 
44divided proportionally based on the portion of their place(s) of use acquired by the new owner" 
and attached a copy of the Warranty Deed, admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit 29. 
29. On March 9, 2012 and by subsequent revision on March 22, 2012, the IDWR 
revised its water right database to indicate Ms. Greenheart as the current owner of portions of the 
Water Rights, and reduced the quantity of water and irrigated acres authorized under the Water 
Rights decreed to the Browns commensurately. 
30. On July 17, 2012, the Browns entered into an amended agreement to sell their 
remaining portions of Water Rights 61-2188 and 61-7151 to the City of Mountain Home for 
$466,400.00 under the terms in Plaintiff's Exhibit 36. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The issue at trial was whether there was a mutual mistake in the warranty deed. The 
party asserting mutual mistake bears the burden of proof. 1\Jurr v. Selag Corp., 113 Idaho 773, 
777, 747 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Ct. App. 1987). That burden is significant-mutual mistake must be 
proven by clear and convincing evidence. Cline v. Hoyle & Associates, Ins., Inc., 108 Idaho 162, 
164, 697 P.2d 1176, 1178 (1985). Mutual mistake is a question of fact and a trial court's finding 
will only be overturned if clearly erroneous. Id. 




A mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting, share a 
misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon which they based their bargain. Bailey 
v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 639, 671P.2d1099, 1102 (Ct App. 1983). The mistake must be 
material or, in other words, so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties. 
Id; O'Connor v. Harger Construction, Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008). 
A mistake is defined as an unintentional act or omission arising from ignorance, surprise 
or misplaced confidence. Bailey at 639, 671 P.2d at 1102. As stated, the mistake in question 
must be shared among the parties. In Idaho, as long as there is a different belief as to the same 
assumption of fact, the mistake is mutual. Before relief will be granted, it must appear that the 
mistake is mutual. Udelavitz v. Ketchen, 33 Idaho 165, 190, 191 P. 1029, 1030 (1920). 
A. An Unintentional Act or Omission Occurred 
As to the first of the elements, proof of a mistake-an unintentional act or omission 
arising from ignorance, surprise or misplaced confidence-is required. Bailey at 639, 671 P.2d 
at 1102. Here, the mistake was a belief that no water rights were being transferred as part of the 
sale of the property when, in fact, the Warranty Deed used language that effected just such a 
transfer. Mr. Brown's testified he conveyed to Mr. Rhead that he did not intend to sell the water 
rights and that the sale was to be as dry ground. The Browns had a pending contract for the sale 
of the Water Rights from mid-2006 (before the listing of the property for sale) all the way until 
2009. The Water Rights were never used on the Greenheart Property. 
Ms. Greenheart testified that she contacted Mr. Rhead looking for property in the 
Mountain Home area that was vacant land. She testified that she inquired about water on the 
property and was told the property was "dry" and that she thought that meant "dry." She testified 
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that she does not remember what she understood water rights to mean in 2007, although she 
testified to a different result in obtaining some access to water on her Emmett, Idaho, property. 
The Seller's Property Disclosure Form indicated not applicable next to the entry for irrigation 
water available and the broker's listing had a "blank" next to irrigation. There was much 
discussion at trial of the parties' understanding of Paragraph 16 of the Vacant Land Purchase and 
Sale Agreement. Mr. Brown thought that paragraph meant water rights were excluded since not 
listed; while Ms. Greenheart testified she thought they were included since not specifically 
excluded. When interpreting a contract, this Court begins with the document's language. Cristo 
Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 308, 160 P.3d 743, 747 (2007). "In the absence 
of ambiguity, the document must be construed in its plain, ordinary and proper sense, according 
to the meaning derived from the plain wording of the instrument." C & G, 1nc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 
763, 765, 25 P.3d 76, 78 (2001). A contract term is ambiguous when there are two different 
reasonable interpretations or the language is nonsensical. Swanson v. Beco Constr. Co., 145 
Idaho 59, 62, 175 P.3d 748, 751 (2007). Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, 
but interpreting an ambiguous term is an issue of fact. Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, 
L.L.C., 141Idaho185, 190, 108 P.3d 332, 337 (2005)(quotation omitted). 
As noted above in the findings of fact, the documents and the conversations which 
occurred before the signing of the Warranty Deed indicate that it was not the intent of the 
Browns to convey the Water Rights and Ms. Greenheart intended to purchase "dry" land. 
Although Ms. Greenheart testified that the land may have had a well or that one had been 
proposed, she never testified that she believed it actually had a well. Additionally, she testified 
she had foregone an inspection of the property before the sale and that she did not actually think 




there was a well. Her testimony was that she was "okay" with having a well but knew she had 
the risk of an additional expense to dig a well if one was not on the property. 
Although Ms. Greenheart was not told about the decreed Water Rights until 2012, in 
reviewing all of the evidence at trial, the court does not find that there was an intentional 
misrepresentation or secreting of the existing Water Rights. While Jay Brown, Christine Brown, 
and Augusta Greenheart are all articulate, intelligent people, none have formal training in civil 
law or specifically in water rights in Idaho. The explanation that the Browns had the Water 
Rights under contract for sale and thought they were conveyed separately, although mistaken, is 
reasonable and without fraud or malice. Additionally, the fact that a significant portion of the 
Water Rights were leased to the water bank served to avoid abandonment of the beneficial use of 
the rights. The court has already noted its observations of Ms. Greenheart's demeanor and 
testimony at trial and its determination the credibility of her explanations of her recollection from 
six years ago. Both of the parties relied upon Mr. Rhead and the title company for their 
expertise. Since both Mr. Rhead and the title company's services were procured and paid for by 
both parties, neither party is entitled to a presumption against the drafter of the sale documents or 
the Warranty Deed. 
Based upon the evidence at trial, Ms. Greenheart at the time of contracting understood 
that access to water on the property was only by a proposed well on the property. At the time of 
the sale, Idaho Code §§ 42-227 and 42-111 provided that no water right was necessary to operate 
a well for domestic purposes. Although Ms. Greenheart did not have the specific information 
available as to how a well could exist on the property, as a matter of law, there was and is a legal 
means to obtain a well. Her understanding at the time of sale that a well would not be "cheap" is 
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also correct. The omission of references to specific references of the Water Rights was 
unintentional given that they were already under contract for sale. 
B. The Mistake was Common to Both Parties 
The court previously discussed its assessment of whether there was an omission of the 
Water Rights in the sale transaction and Ms. Greenheart's credibility at trial along with her 
subsequent admissions as to her belief of whether there were water rights at the time of sale. The 
court adopts those findings of fact and conclusions of law in this part of the decision and 
detennines these were a mistake common to both parties. Even though Ms. Greenheart was not 
aware of the adjudicated Water Rights until 2012, she still had a mistaken belief that there were 
no water rights intended to be conveyed or actually conveyed in the 2007 sale. 
The parties do not have to make the exact same mistake, so long as they share the same 
basic misassumption of fact. A '4tnutual mistake also has been defined to include situations in 
which the parties labor under differing misconceptions as to the same basic assumption or vital 
fact." Bailey v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 639, 671 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Ct. App. 1983). According to 
the Restatement of Contracts, Section 152 cmt. H, "[t]he rule stated in this Section applies only 
where both parties are mistaken as to the same basic assumption. Their mistakes need not be, and 
often they will not be, identical." Based upon the evidence at trial of the understanding oftha 
parties at the time of the contract for sale, both parties in this case shared the same basic 
misassumption that no water rights were being transferred. While the Browns knew precisely 
what water rights were, they were mistaken that having the sale of the Water Rights under a 
pending contract removed them from the sale of the land. Ms. Greenheart had a less precise 
understanding of what water rights were but she still did not believe in 2007 that she had 
pW'Chased any water rights other than perhaps access to either a well or to dig a well. While she 
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testified at trial that she was unclear at the time of contracting as to the distinction between water 
rights and swface water rights, the court considered her statements after the sale for purposes of 
impeachment. It is clear from Ms. Greenheart's own statements after the sale that she knew and 
understood the property had been sold as "dry" without water rights. Thus, there was a 
commonality of mistake as to the same basic assumption, that no ''water rights" were being 
transferred. 
C. The Mistake was Material 
The third element of mutual mistake, materiality, means essentially that the mistake is so 
substantial and fundamental that it defeats the object of the party asserting mistake. 0 'Connor v. 
Harger Construction, Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008)(quoting Primary 
Health Network, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Admin., 137 Idaho 663, 668, 52 P.3d 307, 312 (2002)). 
Mr. Brown testified to the value of the water rights and how he would not have gone forward 
with the sale had he known the Water Rights were being included. Mr. Brown initiated the 
adjudication for the Water Rights at issue in this case. He testified that the priority dates of the 
Water Rights granted were relatively senior water rights out in that area and valuable. 
A significant portion of the Water Rights had been leased to the water bank since 2003 
which prohibited the use of the water on the property but served to avoid abandonment of the 
rights. The Browns had also entered into a contract in mid-2006 with Idaho Water Company or 
Del Coates at a price of $1,450 per acre. It is also significant that it was Ms. Greenheart who 
contacted the real tor about the potential sale of vacant land and that it was not the Browns who 
initially contacted the realtor to initiate the sale of the land. 
Mr. Brown testified that at the time of listing the property he told the realtor, Mr. Rhead, 
that in coming up with a price, it was "for the dry ground, and there would be no water rights to 
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go with it." Mr. Brown testified that in coming up with that price, he had a friend who sold 
property to the north of this property by two miles for $1,500 an acre without water rights 
whereas another friend sold development property for around $3,000 an acre with water rights. 
Mr. Brown testified it was not his intent to transfer water rights to Ms. Greenheart at the time of 
the sale of the Greenheart Property. Both of the Browns testified they would not have signed the 
Warranty Deed had they known that it was in fact transferring the Water Rights at issue. 
Therefore, the mistake was material. 
D. Mistake Shown by Clear and Convincing Evidence 
The Plaintiff bore the burden of proof at trial to show there was a mutual mistake proven 
by clear and convincing evidence. In reviewing the testimony of all witnesses at trial and the 
exhibits admitted into evidence, the Plaintiff has met this significant burden. The Plaintiffs have 
shown that both parties, at the time of contracting, shared a misconception about a vital fact upon 
which they based their bargain. This mistake that no Water Rights were intended to be 
transferred with the land was material and so substantial and :fundamental as to defeat the object 
of the parties. The Browns had intended to sell the Water Rights separately even before the land 
was listed for sale. Ms. Greenheart had intended to have vacant land with low taxes and low 
maintenance that she understood was "dry'" to assist in accomplishing her goals. Each party's 
mistake was unintentional and arose from all three: ignorance, surprise and misplaced 
confidence. So, although there were different reasons for the mistake, the mistake was still 
shared among the parties. The Plaintiff met its burden of proof at trial by showing clear and 
convincing evidence of a mutual mistake. 
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E. The Affirmative Defense of the Statute of Limitations for Mutual Mistake 
The Defendant raised the affirmative defense that the statute of limitations has run for a 
claim of mistake. In analyzing other statute of limitations defenses, this Court previously held: 
Applying the plain language of Idaho Code Section 6-401, the applicable statute 
of limitations did not begin to run until Greenheart asserted an adverse claim 
against the water rights by filing with I.D.W.R. There is no evidence in the 
record that Greenheart made any claims in any form or degree to any alleged 
water rights for the land she pW'Chased from January 29, 2007, until February 17, 
2012. So, filing with the l.D.W.R. was the first instance Greenheart asserted any 
ownership in the water rights adverse to Plaintiffs. Therefore, this quiet title 
action filed on April 5, 2012, is well within all the statute of limitations asserted 
by the parties. 
Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment at p. 7. 
Now, the Defendant argues Idaho Code§ 5-218(4) applies and that the three-year statute 
of limitations for a claim based on mistake has passed. The Defendant bears the burden of 
proving this affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Idaho Code Section 5-218( 4) provides a plaintiff has three years to file suit for: 
[a ]n action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. The cause of action in 
such case not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved 
party, of the faets constituting the fraud or mistake. 
Idaho Code§ 5-218(4). The statute oflimitations begins to run at the discovery of"facts 
constituting the ... mistake." The Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs should have discovered the 
mistake at three points, each of which would have been more than three years prior to the filing 
of the Complaint in the instant action: (1) at the time of the execution of the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement; (2) at the time of the execution of the warranty deed; and (3) when Jay Brown was 
contacted by Ms. Greenheart in June 2007 to tell him the property was assessed as irrigated. 
Nothing in the PW'Chase and Sale Agreement would have given notice to the Browns or 
Ms. Greenheart of facts constituting the mistake. In fact, any part of that agreement that would 
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have provided notice would have also avoided this entire litigation. The same is true of the 
execution of the Warranty Deed. While payment for legal advice in reviewing the deed would 
have been money well spen~ both parties paid for and acquired the services of a realtor and a 
title company in the preparation of the deed. The question for the court is whether the Browns 
could have discovered the mistake in 2007 by the exercise of due diligence. Aitken v. Gill, 108 
Idaho 900, 902, 702 P.2d 1360, 1362 (Ct. App. 1985). It is clear from the evidence that the 
Browns read the Warranty Deed before they signed the deed but did not attach the weighty legal 
significance to three words ''with their appurtenances" that these words actually carry. They 
obtained the assistance of a licensed realtor to assist with the sale and the assistance of a 
professional title company to assist in the document preparation. The Defendant would like for 
this court to rule that not understanding these three words was ''negligence" or that not obtaining 
legal counsel to provide advice on its legal significance was ''negligence." Although many states 
require licensed legal advice before a real estate closing, this court will not hold that to be the 
law in Idaho or find that the absence of legal advice at closing is negligence per se. This is not 
an issue of negligence but rather whether the Browns could have discovered the mistake in the 
exercise of due diligence. 
To assist the trial court on remand, the Aitken court noted that the recordation of the 
deeds only provided notice to subsequent purchasers and no had bearing on the due diligence of 
the sellers. Due diligence is a question of the seller's actual knowledge when they signed and 
delivered the deeds. Id at 901, 702 P.2d at 1361. 
"Unless ... it is clearly shown that the parties intended that the grantor would reserve 
[water rights], appurtenant water rights pass with the land even though they are not mentioned in 
the deed and the deed does not mention 'appurtenances."' Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 
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803, 241P.3d972, 976 (2010). Although the Defendant bears the burden of proof on this 
affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the actual knowledge of the Browns and 
the parties' intent to reserve the water rights appurtenant to the land at issue have already been 
discussed and analyzed in the court's previous discussion of mistake. So, although the 
Defendant bears the burden by a lower standard on this affirmative defense, the court has already 
concluded the Plaintiff has shown by clear and convincing evidence there was a material mutual 
mistake and that, absent such mistake, the Browns would not have sold the property to Ms. 
Greenheart using the Warranty Deed conveyed. The conclusions of fact and law will not be 
reiterated here but this court finds these facts support that the Browns had no actual knowledge 
upon execution of the Warranty Deed that the water rights were conveyed and that they had 
procured the professional assistance necessary to prepare the documents and adequately 
reviewed the documents to fulfill their requirements for due diligence at that time. Therefore, 
this court does not find that the execution of the warranty dead was a mistake that could have 
been discovered at that time with the exercise of due diligence that would have started the 
running of the three years statute of limitations for mistake. · 
Next, in reviewing all of the evidence surrounding Mr. Brown's June 9, 2007 letter to the 
Board of Equalization, this Court finds that neither party was sufficiently on notice simply 
because the County began assessing the property as irrigated. Ms. Greenheart indicated 
"surprise" at the assessment. Mr. Brown stated he previously owned the property nineteen years 
and it was never once irrigated. And most telling, the Board of Equalization's minutes confirm 
the adjustment "has been made back to dry grazing ... .'' The Court, after hearing all of the 
evidence in this case, finds that the Idaho Code§ 5-218(4) statute of limitations began to run at 
the discovery of "facts constituting the ... mistake." In the evidence before the court, the 




discovery of the facts constituting the mistake would have been during Mr. Brown's 
conversation with Mr. Creamer about the legal effect of the "with their appurtenances" language 
of the deed in 2012. Therefore, this action was filed well within the statute of limitations and the 
Defendant has not shown the affirmative defense of the running of the statute of limitations by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
F. Count 2 for Promissory Estoppel 
The Plaintiff has not met their burden of proof of promissory estoppel by a 
preponderance of the evidence. The Plaintiff was required to show each element of l) reliance 
upon a specific promise; 2) substantial economic loss to the promisee as a result of such reliance, 
3) the loss to the promisee was or should have been foreseeable by the promisor, and 4) the 
promisee's reliance on the promise must have been reasonable. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, 
Inc., v. Idaho First Nat'/ Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 182, 804 P.2d 900, 911 (1991). No 
evidence was presented by the Plaintiffs that any forbearance on their part was caused by Ms. 
Greenheart. The Browns had already placed the Water Rights under contract before they even 
knew Ms. Greenheart was interested in purchasing land in the area, and that contract ended on its 
own terms by nonperformance of the parties. The Plaintiffs have not proved their claim of 
promissory estoppel. 
G. Count 2 for Quasi Estoppel 
Quasi-estoppel "prevents a party from asserting a right, to the detriment of another party, 
which is inconsistent with a position previously taken." C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. 
No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 144, 75 P.3d 194, 198 (2003). The doctrine applies when: l) The 
offending party took a different position than his or her original position, and 2) either the 
offending party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party, the other party 
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was induced to change positions, or it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to 
maintain an inconsistent position from one from which he or she has already derived a benefit or 
in which he or she has acquiesced. Allen v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807, 812, 186 P.3d 663, 668 
(2008). In Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 114, 13 8 P .3d 310, 314 (2006), the court stated "to 
prove quasi-estoppel ... there must be evidence that it would be unconscionable to permit the 
offending party to assert allegedly contrary positions." 
The Court finds Ms. Greenheart is now taking a different position than her original 
position wherein she disclaimed any interest in water rights in 2007 and 2009. The Court 
considered Ms. Greenheart's admissions that she asked Mr. Rhead and was told the property was 
"dry;'' that she was "very surprised" to find the land assessed as irrigated six months after the 
sale. The court also considered her repeated admissions to the .~sessor in 2007 and to Elmore 
County in 2009 that she knew at the time of the sale that the property was "dry" and lacked an 
irrigation system or a water right. 
Ms. Greenheart has gained a tax advantage over the years by taking the original position 
that the land was "dry" at the time she bought Additionally, Ms. Greenheart's actions in 
confirming the mistaken mutual assumption caused a disadvantage to the Browns because the 
Browns could have sold the Water Rights they had under contract, or at least discovered the 
mistake and clarified ownership of the rights sooner. In review of all of the evidence before the 
court, including the contracted water rights value as well as the contracts for sale of those rights, 
the Court does find it would also be unconscionable to permit Dr. Greenheart, having received 
the tax benefit and met her goals of acquiring low-maintenance and low-tax vacant land, to 
essentially take a windfall of additional water rights that were never intended by the parties at the 
time of their contract. 
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H. Count 2 for Waiver 
In the court's decision on summary judgment, the court found the Plaintiff had not 
presented evidence of waiver. Regarding waiver, The Idaho Supreme Court summarized the 
doctrine of waiver as follows: 
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is a voluntary act 
and implies election by a party to dispense with something of value or to forego 
some right or advantage which [the party] might at [the party's] option have 
demanded and insisted upon. 
A party asserting waiver must have acted in reliance upon the waiver and altered 
the party's position. 
Waiver is an equitable doctrine based upon fairness and justice. The existence of 
waiver ordinarily is a question of fact and is foremost a question of intent. In 
order to establish waiver the intention to waive must clearly appear, although it 
may be established by conduct. 
Hecla Min. Co. v. Star-Morning Min. Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1992). At 
time of summary judgment, the Plaintiff did not present the evidence that the Plaintiff had again 
entered into another contract for sale of the Water Rights. Because of this evidence, the court 
has reconsidered its earlier decision as to waiver. Since the Brown's 2007 agreement to sell the 
water rights predated any interaction with Ms. Greenheart and was terminated for other reasons, 
there is no evidence that Plaintiffs altered their position in reliance upon any alleged waiver. 
However, at trial, the Plaintiffs proved that they had subsequently entered into another contract 
for sale of the Water Rights acting in reliance upon Ms. Greenheart's assertions to Elmore 
County that she did not have any water rights on the property. Although this court has 
previously found that the Plaintiff has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. 
Greenheart understood that she did not have water rights at the time of the sale, even if an 
appellate court later finds that determination erroneous, this court finds as a fact that if Ms. 
Greenheart had water rights, she intentionally relinquished those rights by waiver. Ms. 
C1ccnhcart ft3ked Mr. Brown's ft3sistance ht asserting that she did not have wate1 lights befote 
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the County. Mr. Brown knew that Ms. Greenheart had indicated to the County that she did not 
have water rights. Mr. Brown relied upon Ms. Greenheart's statement when he entered into a 
contract for the whole Water Rights with the City of Mountain Home. That contract between the 
Browns and the City of Mountain Home also had to be later amended because of Ms. 
Greenheart's claim to IDWR and this lawsuit asserting that she owns a proportion of those Water 
Rights. 
In addressing any equitable remedies available to this court, the court has considered 
these factors in whether it should just rescind the sale and place the parties back to the status quo 
before the sale of the land. Since the evidence before this court is that Ms. Greenheart intended 
to buy "dry" vacant land for a cost of$80,000.00 at the time of the sale, the Court's remedy must 
also address her desire to invest her inheritance from her mother in land in the Mountain Home 
area. In reviewing all of the evidence before the court at trial, the court has elected not to simply 
rescind the sale and Warranty Deed since both parties did actually intend a sale of the 80-acre 
parcel. 
EQUITABLE RELIEF GRANTED AND DIRECTIONS FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court finds in favor 
of the Plaintiffs on Count l, Contract Interpretation, and Count 2, Quasi-Estoppel and Waiver, in 
the Complaint to Quiet Title. 
Mutual mistake may be employed to modify or reform a document so as to reflect the 
parties' true intent. Primary Health Network, Inc., v. State, Dep 't of Admin., 137 Idaho 663, 668, 
52 P.3d 307, 312 (2002). Reformation is available to a trial court even where not sought as part 
of the original complaint. See e.g. Collins v. Parlcinson, 96 Idaho 294, 527 P.2d 1252 (1974). 
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In this case, mutual mistake and the doctrines of quasi estoppel and waiver justify the 
Court reforming the deed to become the deed that the parties would have made but for the 
mistake. Based on the forgoing, it is hereby ordered that judgment consistent with the foregoing 
be entered on Counts 1 and 2 of the Complaint to Quiet Title in favor of the Plaintiffs. Counsel 
for the Browns is to submit a proposed-form of judgment suitable for recording in the real -
property records that decrees that the deed from the Browns to Dr. Greenheart is reformed 
effective as of the date of that original deed so that the last paragraph of the Warranty Deed is 
reformed to read: 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD said premises, with their appurtenances (specifically 
excluding and reserving unto grantor all of its right, title and interest in Water 
Right Nos. 61-2188 and 61-7151) unto the said Grantee and to the Grantee's heirs 
and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does hereby covenant to and with the 
said Grantee, that the Grantor is the owner in fee simple of said premises; that 
they are free from all encumbrances except as described above and that Grantor 
will warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever. 
Additionally, the judgment may also be used by Plaintiff Jay Brown to file a Notice of 
Change in Water Right Ownership for Water Right Nos. 61-2188 and 61-7151 with the State of 
Idaho Department of Water Resources once this litigation has concluded. 
This Court finds that Ms. Greenheart derived benefit of water supply bank lease 
payments during the time this litigation was pending and the value of those l~ p1:1yments 
should also be paid to the Plaintiffs. 
The Plaintiffs are the prevailing party herein and are entitled to their costs. A final 
judgment and decree incorporating these finds may be entered accordingly. 
IT IS SO ORDERED and DATED this 10th day of May, 2013. 
Lynn Norton 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this J{j_~y of May, 2013, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated: 
Michael C. Creamer 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
Givens Pursley LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise ID 83701-2720 
Victor Villegas 
Borton & Lakey 
141 E. Carlton Avenue 
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BARBARA STEELE 
Clerk 
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v .. · 
Michael C. Creamer (Idaho State Bar ID# 4030) 
Thomas E. Dvorak (Idaho State Bar ID# 5043) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Telephone: 208-388-1200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
I n8877 _l (11543-3) 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON-
BROWN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 
GREENHEART, an individual, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-353 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS A FINAL JUDGMENT 
IN THIS MATTER: 
1. That final judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant 
on all counts and claims for relief of the Complaint; 
2. That effective January 29, 2002, the last paragraph of that certain Warranty Deed 
from J. B. Brown and Christine M. Hopson-Brown, husband and wife, as grantors, to Augusta 
Sayoko D. Mimoto Greenheart, as grantee, regarding certain real property located in Section 24 




Warranty Deed, which was executed on January 29, 2007 and recorded as Instrument No. 
384017 in the real property records of Elmore County, Idaho on January 30, 2007, at 1 :56 p.m. is 
hereby reformed as follows. The last para~ph of said Warranty Deed is hereby reformed and 
revised as follows: 
To have and to hold said premises, with their appurtenances 
(specifically excluding and reserving unto Grantor all of its ript 
title and interest in Water Ri&ht Nos. 61-2188 and 61-7151) unto 
the said Grantee and to Grantee's heirs and assigns forever. And 
the said Grantor does hereby covenant to and with the said 
Grantee, that the Grantor is the owner in fee simple of said 
premises, that they are free from all encumbrances except as 
described above and that the Grantor will warrant and defend the 
same from all lawful claims whatsoever; 
3. That a certified copy of this Judgment may be recorded in the real property 
records of Elmore County, Idaho and once so recorded shall serve as prima facie evidence of the 
ruling of the Court described herein; 
4. That a certified copy of this Judgment may be used by Plaintiffs to file a notice of 
change in water right ownership for Water Right Nos. 61-2188 and 61-7151 with the State of 
Idaho, Department of Water Resources, so as to recognize the Browns complete ownership of 
Water Right Nos. 61-2188 and 61-7151 and so that the Department may change its records 
accordingly; and 
5. That the Plaintiffs may file a Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees within 
the appropriate time as allowed under the court rules, and if the Court grants the same any such 
amounts awarded may be included in an Amended Judgment. 
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Michael C. Creamer (Idaho State Bar ID # 4030) 
Thomas E. Dvorak (Idaho State Bar ID# 5043) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 




Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON-
BROWN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 
GREENHEART, an individual, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-353 
PLAINTIFFS' VERIFIED 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEYS' FEES 
Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (the "Browns"), by and through their 
attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP, hereby submits this Verified Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorneys' Fees as follows: 
I. COSTS AS A MA TIER OF RIGHT 
A. Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l), the Browns are Entitled 
to Costs as a Matter of Right. 
After the trial of this matter, the Browns were afforded substantially all of the relief that 
they sought in their Complaint. There can be no argument that they were not the prevailing party 
in this matter as defined by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l )(B). Indeed, this Court held in its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of taw and Directions for Entry of Jndgment that "Th:e Pmintim are me prevaiUng 
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party herein and are entitled to their costs."1 Accordingly, the Browns, as the prevailing party, 
now submit their costs as a matter of right as outlined in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(d)(l)(C) as follows: 
1) Court Filin2 Fees-IRCP 54{d){l)(C)(l) 
Court Filirlg Fee 4/3/2012 $88.0( 
2) Fees for Service of Any Pleading or Document-
IRCP 54(d)(l)(q(2) 
Service of Summons Fee 4/18/2012 
$75.9( 
3) Reasonable Costs of the Preparation of Models, $30.0( 
Maps, Pictures, Photographs or Other Exhibits 
Admitted Into Evidence at a Hearing or Trial of an 
Action 
4) Reporting and Transcribing of a Deposition $779.15 
11/5/2012 M&M Court Reporting Deposition of 
Defendant 
TOTAL COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT $973.05 
As such, the Browns are entitled to an award for their costs as a matter of right in the 
amount of$973.05. 
II. DISCRETIONARY COSTS 
A. Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(D), the Browns Are 
Entitled to Discretionary Costs. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(D) provides "[a]dditional items of cost not 
enumerated in, or in an amount in excess of that listed in subparagraph (C), may be allowed upon 
a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should 
in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party." The determination of whether to 
award costs pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)( 1 )(D) is a matter of discretion with 
the trial court. Roe v. Harris, 128 Idaho 569, 917 P.2d 403 (1996). 
The discretionary costs incurred by the Browns are set forth in detail below and were 
1 See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Direction for Entry of Judgment at p. 27. 
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necessarily and reasonably incurred by Stanley in prosecuting claims against Greenheart and 
were exceptional to this litigation as set forth in the Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak filed 
concurrently herewith. These are itemized as follows. 
1) Serving Expense $160.00 
4/30/13 Serving expenses for attempts to locate and 
serve realtor Darryl Rhead, who, despite efforts to find 
and serve him, could not be found 
2) Transcript Expense $385.2: 
A copy of a transcript expense incurred of the trial 
proceeding so as to provide an Amended Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law for the Court 
2) Professional Fees 
Alliance Title & Escrow Corp. - Premium for a title $125.0( 
insurance policy litigation report associated with filing a 
lis pendens on the property 
3) Recording Fees 
Lis Pendens 4/3/12 $16.0( 
4) Electronic Research $489.13 
2/28/13 Westlaw Research 
5) Photocopies $208.1: 
TOT AL DISCRETIONARY COSTS $1383.S~ 
As such, the Browns are entitled to an award for discretionary costs in the amount of 
$1,223 .5 3. To the extent any of the discretionary costs listed above are in fact costs as a matter 
of right, they are hereby sought on that basis as well. 
The costs claimed above as mandatory and discretionary and attorneys fees claimed 
below are correct and claimed in accordance with all applicable rules. As set forth above, and in 
additional detail shown in the Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak, the Browns hereby request an 
award for their costs in the total amount of $2,356.58 (which includes $973.05 total costs as a 
matter of right and $1,383.53 total discretionary costs). 
III. ATTORNEYS' FEES 
The fee arrangement between the Browns and Givens Pursley LLP is on a time and hour 
basis. The rates of the attorneys who worked on this matter are set forth in Exhibit A to the 
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Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak, which is a true and correct summary of Givens Pursley's billing 
records for this matter and is incorporated herein by reference. The attorneys and paralegals 
whose initials appear on Exhibit A are identified in the Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak filed 
contemporaneously herewith and incorporated herein by this reference and restated as if set forth 
in full. The fees set forth in Exhibit A are true and correct and are submitted in compliance with 
Rules 54( d) and 54( e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The factors to be considered by the 
Court in determining the amount of a fee award are discussed in detail in the Affidavit of 
Thomas E. Dvorak filed contemporaneously herewith. 
The total amount of attorneys' fees the Browns incurred in pursuing this matter amount to 
$59, 193.50. 
The attorneys' fees the Browns claim are reasonable and contemplated under Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 54. There are two independent substantive grounds in the present case for the 
award of attorneys' fees. The first is the fact that the claims can be classed as a "commercial 
transaction" in accordance with Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) and the second is the language of 
the parties' agreement. 
Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) provides: 
In any civil action to recover ... in any commercial transaction .. 
., the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee 
to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all 
transactions except transactions for personal or household 
purposes. 
Idaho Code Section 120(3). It has been held that "where a party alleges the existence of a 
contract that would be a commercial transaction under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3), that claim 
triggers the application of the statute and the prevailing party may recover attorneys' fees even if 
no ha5tltfy under ffie contfact is esta611sfied." Pelerson v. Siiore, I45 Idano 476, 197 P.3d 789 · 
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(Ct. App. 2008)(citing Lexington Heights Dev., LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 297, 982 
P.3d 526, 537 (2004)). 
The Complaint in this case included allegations relating to the interpretation and import 
of the purchase and sale agreement in this case and the Answer and affirmative defenses did as 
well. This was a large property, 60 acres, and the Defendant testified that she intended to invest 
her inheritance from her mother in vacant land with low taxes. Presumably, this was to grow the 
investment for profit. At the time of purchase in 2007, the Defendant owned several other pieces 
of property as well and resided in Las Vegas, Nevada, and she continues to reside in Las Vegas, 
Nevada, at this time, so it does not appear she intended to personally reside on the property. The 
Defendant also prepared and executed a Dry Grazing Lease leasing all the property for purposes 
of dry grazing back to the Plaintiffs in the transaction shortly after the purchase in 2007 and 
postdated it to the date of sale. Based on these facts, it appears that this lawsuit did indeed center 
on a commercial transaction and an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-
120(3) is appropriate. See e.g., Hoffer v. Callister, 137 Idaho 291, 47 P.3d 1261 (2002)(where 
lawsuit was made for breach of contract of sale and breach of warranty against encumbrances 
over zoning violation allegedly existing in a mobile home park that was sold, court awarded 
attorneys' fees under 12-120(3) saying that the "case centers on commercial transactions."). 
As an additional independent basis for an award of attorneys' fees, the parties' purchase 
and sale agreement contains a clear attorneys' fees provision. More specifically, paragraph 9 of 
that agreement states: 
If either party initiates or defends ... legal action or proceedings 
which are in any way connected with this agreement, the 
prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the non-
prevailing party reasonable costs and attorneys' fees, including 
such costs and fees on appeal. 2 
2 See Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit 6 at paragraph 9. 
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The arguments in this case were connected with an interpretation of that very agreement. 
Indeed, the Court found the parties' intent in that agreement with respect to water rights was 
ambiguous and looked to other evidence of the intent of the parties to determine mistake in 
reforming the parties' deed. The information in that contract was also connected with the 
Court's rulings on the waiver and quasi estoppel claims in Plaintiffs' favor. Accordingly, an 
award of attorneys' and costs incurred in this matter is appropriate based on the agreement of the 
parties. 
The following summary reflects the total amount of costs and attorneys' fees that the 








The Browns should, in the interest of justice and under the laws of Idaho, be awarded 
their claimed costs in the amount of $2,356.58 and attorneys' fees in the amount of$59,193.50, 
for a total amount of $61,550.08. 
rt 
DATED this~day of May, 2013. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
Thdmas E. Dvorak 
Attorneys for Jay and Christine Brown 





County of Ada ) 
I, THOMAS E. DVORAK, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say: 
I am one of the attorneys representing Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown 
in the above-captioned action, and as such, I have knowledge of the fee and cost amounts itemized 
in Plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees and the circumstances under 
which they were incurred. 
I have reviewed Plaintiffs Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees. The fees 
and costs described therein are true and correct and were reasonably and necessarily incurred in the 
prosecution of this action. To the best of my understanding, the fees and costs shown herein are in 
compliance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to me this~ day of May, 2013. 
~-Ctwt1~ 
NOTARYPUBLiCOR IDAHO 
Residing at Meridian, Ada County 
My Commission Expires: 1127/19 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thisl_ ~y of May, 2013, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated: 
Victor Villegas 
Borton & Lakey 
141 E. Carlton A venue 




_ Overnight Courier 
VU.S.Mail 
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Michael C. Creamer (Idaho State Bar ID# 4030) 
Thomas E. Dvorak (Idaho State Bar ID# 5043) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bann'1ck Street 
Post Office Box 2720 




Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown 
Lli1Ht~Y31 AH\0:22 
BAaJ.\r( f~ J. t.t.LE 
CLERK OF THE. COURT 
OEPUT~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON-
BROWN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 
GREENHEART, an individual, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-353 
PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR 
COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES 
Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown (the "Browns") hereby move this 
Court, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) and the 
agreement of the parties, for an order awarding the Browns their reasonable costs and attorneys' 
fees in obtaining judgment as the prevailing party in this matter. 
This Application is supported by the Court's record and documents already on file in this 
litigation, the Brown's Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees, and the Affidavit of 
Thomas E. Dvorak in Support of the Browns' Application for Costs and Attorneys' Fees, all 
filed concurrently herewith, together with such other pleadings and documents as may be filed 




DATED this_ day of May, 2013. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
Attorneys for Jay and Christine Brown 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thisJt?'dt of May, 2013, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated: 
Victor Villegas 
Borton & Lakey 
141 E. Carlton Avenue 




_ Overnight Courier 
Vlfs.Mail 
PURSUANT TO COURT'S ORDER - JUDGE'S COPY SENT VIA EMAIL 
lnorton@adaweb.net 
hfurst(@,3 lmorecounty.org 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES- 2 
577 
Michael C. Creamer (Idaho State Bar ID# 4030) 
Thomas E. Dvorak (Idaho State Bar ID# 5043) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 




Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown 
-·:11 co 
' 1-~ 
' : : LI~ 'J I"\ I Au 10: 2 2 
.. .,, 1..i ' I ,J hi I 
BARJARA STEELE 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
DEPUTY~ 
IN nm DISTRICT COURT OF nm FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR nm 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR nm COUNTY OF ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON-
BROWN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 
GREENHEART, an individual, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV-2012-353 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS E. 
DVORAK IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' VERIFIED 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEYS' FEES 
TIIOMAS E. DVORAK, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
l. I am one of the attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown 
(the "Browns"), in the above-entitled action and make this Affidavit based on my personal 
knowledge as such. 
2. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the items listed herein are correct and 
claimed in compliance wtth the appbcable iiiles. 
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3. I am a partner in the law firm of Givens Pursley LLP and was principally 
responsible for handling and supervising the litigation of the above-captioned matter. I have an 
undergraduate degree in English with a British. Literature emphasis and a minor in business from 
Boise State University obtained in 1991. I obtained ajuris doctorate degree from the University 
of Idaho, College of Law, in 1994. While at law school, I worked as a referee reviewing 
unemployment insmance appeals for the Idaho State Industrial Commission. After law school, I 
worked as a federal law clerk for then-Chief U.S. Magistrate Judge Mikel H. Williams of the 
Federal District Court for the District of Idaho for two years. From 1996 to 1998, I worked for 
the law offices of James J. Davis as an associate attorney with a primary focus on providing 
defense to governmental entities who were sued for violation of Section 1983, i.e., deprivation of 
constitutional rights under color of state law. From 1998 to the present, I have been engaged as 
an attorney with Givens Pursley, and have been a partner with Givens Pursley LLP since 2002. 
My work with Givens Pursley has been primarily commercial litigation with an emphasis on real 
estate and business disputes. 
4. An accurate description and itemization of the costs incurred and the time and 
activities spent in pursuing this case is attached as Exhibit A hereto (the "Itemization"). The 
Plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of Support of Costs and Attorneys' Fees filed concurrently 
herewith and the Itemization are incorporated herein by this reference and restated as if set forth 
in full. 
5. I billed the time I spent on this matter at the rate of $260 per hour and later in 
accordance with an across-the-board yearly increase in rates at $275 per hour, which are my 
usual and customary rates for services of this type. The services I rendered were necessarily 
incurred by the Browns in the defense of this matter. This Affidavit is submitted in support of 
Plaintiffs' Application for Costs and Attorneys' Fees pursuant to Idaho RUie of Civtl Pi'ocedure 
An'IDA vrr OF THOMAS E. DVORAK IN S1JnORT OF 





54 in recognition of the factors the Court must consider in connection with awarding a prevailing 
party its attorneys' fees and costs, particularly the factors listed in Rule 54(e)(3). 
6. My partner, Michael C. Creamer, has been engaged in the practice of law since 
/ 
1989 imd is licensed in the state of Idaho to practice law since 1989. Mr. Creamer has significant 
expertise in the area of water rights and was initially contacted by the Browns because of this 
expertise. He billed his time in this matter at the hourly rate of$270.00. 
7. Associate attorney Alex McLaughlin and paralegals Lisa Nicholas and Eric 
Nelson of the Givens Pursley LLP firm assisted on this case. Mr. McLaughlin has been licensed 
as an attorney in Idaho since 2008. His practice has been almost exclusively focused on 
litigation of real property issues. Mr. McLaughlin's assistance was necessary for some last-
minute intensive research before trial on mistake and other issues. Ms. Nicholas is a senior 
litigation paralegal who has had many years of experience and was invaluable to the case in 
terms of assisting with discovery, depositions and also with the use of exhibits at trial. Eric 
Nelson is a senior real estate paralegal with our office. Mr. Nelson has a backgrmmd working in 
the title insurance industry as a title insurance officer and has also been recognized previously in 
two cases as qualified to testify as an expert witness on chain of title. Mr. Nelson's work in this 
case related to confirming that there were no intervening parties between 2007 and 2012 that 
otherwise would be required to be joined as parties to this lawsuit in adjudicating the water 
rights. Services rendered by this associate and paralegals were necessarily incurred by the 
Browns in the litigation of this matter, and their rates are consistent with the rates of the 
associates and paralegals at other firms in the local area with which I am familiar. Rate 
information for these individuals is shown on the enclosed Itemization. This Itemization was 
prepared from the billing records of Givens Pursley LLP. The record for matter 11543-2 is the 
file that was set up for the sale of water rights from the Browns to the City of Mountain Home. 
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' ' 
It reflects some time by attorney Michael C. Creamer in January and February of 2012. When 
there was doubt as to whether Mr. Creamer's work was directly related to Greenheart's contrary 
claim or if it was otherwise related to the sale of water rights in general, I put the time down but 
did not seek reimbursement for any such fees for the court. The second matter, matter 11543-3, 
is the billing matter that was set up for the quiet title action against Defendant Greenheart. It was 
initiated in March of2012 by our office when it was deemed necessary to file suit. 
8. The work of Lisa Nicholas, paralegal, on this case primarily consisted of 
document production in discovery and trial preparation and her rate reflects her skill and 
experience in this area. 
Rule 54(e)(3) Facton for Attomeys' Fees Award 
9. Time and Labor Reguired. 
This matter arose out of a purchase and sale agreement and a subsequence deed of 
conveyance of real property that was severed from a larger parcel, and a dispute over whether the 
contemplated sale included a conveyance of a pro rata portion of water right nos. 61-2188 and 
61-7151. 
Preparing for the Browns' motion for summary judgment, and opposing and responding 
to Greenheart' s motion for summary judgment, as well as preparing for trial, required 
researching the applicable law, extensive legal analysis, coordinating with witnesses to provide 
affidavits to establish undisputed facts, and drafting the necessart briefing and affidavits, and 
taking the deposition of Defendant. 
The trial of this matter occurred on March Sand 6, 2013. Just prior to trial, the Browns 
filed and argued a Motion in Limine to prohibit testimony of Greenheart's experts related to the 
purchase and sale agreement and related to value of the property. The drafting and arguing of the 
Motion in Limine and the two days of trial required extensive preparation involving legal 
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research and analysis, document review, exhibit and witness preparation, and argument 
outlining. 
10. Novelty and Difficulty of Questions. The issues in this matter required an 
understanding and application of water law and real estate law. 
11. Skill Requisite to Perform Leaal Services and Experience of Counsel. Over the 
last 13 years, my practice has focused on the litigation of commercial and real property disputes. 
My experience in these types of matters allowed me to analyze the facts and law applicable to 
this case and develop the legal theories that led to my client prevailing in summary judgment. 
12. Prevailina Charm for Like Work- As an attorney in Boise, Idaho, who 
represents clients throughout the state of Idaho in both state and federal court, I am familiar with 
the current billing rates of attorneys with practices similar to mine. The rates I charge and the 
rates charged by the other attorneys and paralegals at Givens Pursley LLP who worked on this 
case are consistent with the rates of other professionals with whom I am familiar and who 
practice in litigation in the state of Idaho. 
13. Fee Arranaement. The fee arrangement between the Browns and Givens Pursley 
LLP was based on time and hour basis. 
14. Time Limitations. None. 
15. The Results Obtained. In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Direction 
for Entry of Judgment on May 10, 2013, this Court found in favor of the Browns and against 
Greenheart. This Court determined that a mutual mistake justifying reformation of the deed had 
been shown by clear and convincing evidence, that the statute of limitations applicable to mutual 
mistake did not apply, that the same relief was also justified under quasi estoppel and waiver. 
These were precisely and substantially the relief that the Browns sought to achieve at the 
beginning of the case. 
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16. The Undesirability of the Case. This case was not undesirable, except insofar as 
the difficulty in trying a case relative to the value of the water rights in question versus costs of 
taking a case all the way to trial potentially made it undesirable in that the amount at stake could 
have been close to the costs of trying the case through trial and potentially appeal. 
17. The Nature and Length of Relationship with the Client. Givens Pursley LLP has 
provided legal advice and counsel to the Browns for a number of years on various matters. 
18. Awards in Similar Cases. I am not specifically aware of an award of fees and 
costs in a similar case with similar timelines, facts and issues. 
FURTHER, YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
£4#}( 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
"rt' 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this) I' day of May, 2013. 
AFFIDA V1T OF 'nlOMAS E.. OVORAK IN SUPPORT OF 
Notary Public 
Residing at Meridian, Ada County 
My Commission Expires 1127119 
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CERTD'ICATE or SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on tbis?O-. day of May, 2013, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing docmnent to the persons listed below the method indicated: 
Victor Villegas 
Borton & Lakey 
141 E. Carlton Avenue 
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Jay B. Brown I fity of Mountain Homo ( 11~ I 2 ) 
Date TimikeeDer 
1/24120t2 Mic~el C. Creamer 
1/2612012 Mic ael C. Creamer 
1/30/2012 Mic ael C. Creamer 
2n12012 Mic ael C. Creamer 
218/2012 Micttael C. Creamer 
2116/2012 Micltael C. Creamer 
2121/2012 Mictlael C. Creamer 
2/2212012 Mic~ael C. Creamer 
2/2212012 Mic ael C. Creamer 
212212012 Mic ael C. Creamer 
2/23/2012 Mic ael C. Creamer 
















Rate Amount DescriDUon 
270.00 0.00 Telephone call with J. Brown re: water right agreement 
270.00 0.00 Initial review of documents received from J. Brown. 
270.00 0.00 Meeting with Jay and Christine Brown; review draft Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
270.00 0.00 Telephone conference with J. Friedly; draft Special Warranty Deed, Quitclaim Deed and 
Consent to Transfer; review correspondence from J. Friedly. 







0.00 Review Purchase and Sale Agreement; office conference regarding same; draft 
correspondence to J. Brown. 
891.00 Review IDWR water right backfile; telephone conference with T. Brown; review 
correspondence from Browns; draft letter to Ms. Greenheart; revise Consent and forward 
letter and Consent to clients for review. 
81.00 Finalize and send correspondence to A. Greenheart. 
135.00 Correspond with clients; finalize letter to A. Greenheart. 
81. 00 Finalize and forward letter to A. Greenheart. 
81.00 Teleohone conference with J. Fried 
1,269.00 
!! 
Jay B. Brown I Quiet Title • A. Greenheart ( 11543 I 3 ) 
~ 
Date Hours Rate 
3/1412012 0.10 
311912012 0.50 
3120/2012 ichael C. Creamer 3.80 
3/2112012 ichael C. Creamer 0.50 
3/2312012 ichael C. Creamer 0.50 
3/2612012 ichael C. Creamer 0.60 
3/27/2012 0.30 
312812012 0.60 
312912012 ichael C. Creamer 0.50 
11.116/2612012 ichael C. Creamer 0.50 
~ 8/312012 ichael C. Creamer 0.20 
8/812012 ichael C. Creamer 0.30 
8/1412012 ichael C. Creamer 0.10 
9/1912012 ichael C. Creamer 0.10 
10/2212012 ichael C. Creamer 0.40 
10/26/2012 ichael C. Creamer 3.00 
11/1312012 ichael C. Creamer 0.60 
11/1412012 ichael C. Creamer 0.50 
11/1512012 ichael C. Creamer 0.30 
11120/2012 ichael C. Creamer 0.40 
11121/2012 ichael C. Creamer 2.10 
12/6/2012 ichael C. Creamer 1.50 

























27~00 Office confel'et'lee re: qLliet title~aUit. 
135.00 Telephone conference with D. Smith at IDWR re: revising IDWR water right database 
re: ownership. Review draft Complaint; obtain copies of vesting deeds to Browns. 
1,026.00 Review and revise draft Complaint; telephone conference with J. Homan at IDWR: 
review and revise agreement; f;OfTMpondence to J. Friedly. 
135.00 Forward draft Complaint to dients for review and comment; review IDWR split of 
Brown's water rights; correspondence with IDWR to correct splits. 
135.00 Telephone conference with J. Brown; coordinate obtaining deeds; correspondence 
IDWR. 
162.00 Telephone conference with J. Brown; review and revise Complaint and forward to 
clients. 
81.00 Review litigation guarantee and d-.cls. 
162.00 Prepare exhibits; tetephone conference with J. Brown; telephone conference with J. 
Friedly; forward IDWR letters to J. Friedly. 
135.00 Meeting with J. Brown to obtain signature on Complaint 
135.00 Review discovery responses; office <XHlference with T. Dvorak and telephone 
conference with J. Friedly re: same. 
54.00 Office conference regarding deposing Augusta Greenheart 
81.00 Coordinate deposition at Jay Friedly's office. 
27 .oo Review status of deposition. 
27.00 Review Scheduling Order. 
108.00 Telephone call to D. Smith at Idaho Department of Water Resources; office conference 
re: potential expert witnesses. 
0.00 Attend Greenheart deposition (no charge) 
162.00 Telephone conference with Paul Herrington at SRBA Court regarding jurisdiction of 
SRBA Court over quiet title action; office conference regarding same. 
135.00 Office conference re: motion for summary judgment 
81.00 Initial review of motion for summary judgment and supporting affidavits. 
108.00 Review Brown Affidavit and Realtor's Affidavit re: land values. 
567.00 Review and edit Brown Affidavit and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
450.00 Review and revise Motion for Summary Judgment; review and revise Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
540.00 Review, revise and serve response brief on Motion for Summary Judgment 
1211112012 Nlichael C. Creamer 0.90 300.00 270.00 Office conference regarding discovery responses; review correspondence with City of .· 
Mountain Home: telephone conference with J. Friedly. review, revise and forward 
Protective Agreement 
12117/2012 Nlichael C. Creamer 0.40 300.00 120.00 Review pleadings; office conference regarding Reply Brief of cross-motions for 
summary judgment 
1211912012 iichael C. Creamer 0.80 300.00 240.00 Review Western State decisions on appurtenancy and conveyances. 
12120/2012 ichael C. Creamer 4.80 300.00 1,440.00 Telephone conference with V. Villegas; review filings by V. Villegas; review, revise. 
finalize and serve Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
1212712012 ilchaol c. Creamer 1.50 300.00 450.00 Research western states decisions regarding "appurtenancy" of water right&. 
12128/2012 ichael C. Creamer 4.40 300.00 1,320.00 Continued research regarding •appurtenances" deei&ions in neighboring states. 
1212912012 ichael C. Creamer 6.30 300.00 1,890. 00 Draft Response to Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike. 
12130/2012 ichael C. Creamer 3.50 300.00 1,050.00 Draft Response to Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike 
1213112012 ichael C. Creamer 2.50 300.00 750.00 Finalize, file and serve Reply Brief and Response Brief on Cross-Motions for Sum 
Judgment 
1213112012 ilchaol C. Creamer 2.60 300.00 780.00 Draft Response to Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike. 
1/3/2013 ichael C. Creamer 0.40 300.00 120.00 Office conference regarding oral argument on summary judgment 
1/412013 ichael C. Creamer 2.80 300.00 840.00 Begin preparation for oral argument on Motion for Summary Judgment 
1/612013 ichael C. Creamer 4.00 300.00 1,200.00 Review briefs and prepare argument on Motion for Summary Judgment 
1n12013 ichael C. Creamer 5.00 300.00 1,500.00 Prepare for oral argument; travel to Mountain Home; argue summary judgment motion; 
return to Boise. 
iiJ1 21412013 iichael C. Creamer 0.80 300.00 240.00 Review Order on Summary Judgment; office conference regarding same. 
"" 216/2013 ichael C. Creamer 0.30 300.00 90.00 Attention to decision on Summary Judgment co 21812013 ichael C. Creamer 0.40 300.00 120.00 Telephone conference with district court clerk; review missing pages to summary 
judgment order. 
211212013 tichael C. Creamer 0.30 300.00 90.00 Office conference regarding mediation I trial strategy. 
211812013 ichael C. Creamer 0.70 300.00 210.00 Review court decision on Motion for Summary Judgment; draft memo to TEO and file 
regarding proving mistake in deed. 
2120/2013 !Michael C. Creamer 0.30 300.00 90.00 Office conference regarding response to Greenheart pleadings and review T. Ovo, 
correspondence to clients regarding same. 
212112013 ichael C. Creamer 0.60 300.00 180.00 Coordinate filing of responsive pleadings; locate aerial photos as potential exhibits. 
212612013 ichael C. Creamer 0.20 300.00 60.00 Telephone conference regarding trial preparation issues. 
2127/2013 ichael C. Creamer 0.40 300.00 120.00 Review trial testimony strategy. 
212812013 ichael C. Creamer 0.20 300.00 60.00 Review Greenheart pre-trial motions. 
3/612013 ichael C. Creamer 0.30 300.00 90.00 Office conference r ardin status of testimonv at trail. 
Totals for Mi aal C. Creamer - Working 17,793.00 
3/1412012 homas E. Dvorak 0.50 260.00 130.00 [MCC quiet title] Office conference Mike Creamer regarding facts of case. 
3/1612012 homas E. Dvorak 0.60 260.00 156.00 Telephone conference with Jim Brown; office conference regarding same. 
3117/2012 homas E. Dvorak 2.50 260.00 650.00 Draft quiet title complaint 
311912012 f omas E. Dvorak 1.00 260.00 260.00 Review and revise draft complaint. .· 
3/20/2012 homas E. Dvorak 0.60 260.00 156.00 Office conference regarding revisions to complaint 
3/21/2012 homas E. Dvorak 0.50 260.00 130. 00 Review and revise draft complaint and summons. 
3/23/2012 homas E. Dvorak 0.40 260.00 104.00 Review and revise complaint; office conference regarding same; office conference 
regarding locating process server. 
4/12/20121homas E. Dvorak 0.30 260.00 78.00 Office conference regarding service. 
4/27/2012 homas E. Dvorak 0.30 260.00 78.00 Receive and review e-mail from Gary Tanner regarding appearance and service on 
Green heart. 
4130/2012 r•• E. Dvorak 0.10 260.00 26.00 Draft email to client to update on status. 
5/11/2012 homas E. Dvorak 0.50 260.00 130.00 Review answer; draft report to client. 
5/16/2012 homas E. Dvorak 0.70 260.00 182.00 Telephone conference with Jay Brown regarding strategy and goals in case; draft initial 
discovery outline. 
5/18/20121homas E. Dvorak 0.80 260.00 208.00 Review and revise discovery; telephone message to opposing counsel. 
6/1112012 homas E. Dvorak 0.30 260.00 78.00 Office conference regarding status and latest research on cases involving extrinsic 
evidence to prove reservation of water rights from grant of deed. 
6/13/2012 lhomas E. Dvorak 0.30 260.00 78.00 Receive and review notice of filing discovery service. 
612712012 homas E. Dvorak 1.20 260.00 312.00 Receive and review discovery responses; office conference regarding strategy on 
same. 
6/29/2012 lhomas E. Dvorak 0.70 260.00 182.00 Telephone conference Jay Brown regarding strategy; draft letter to Jay regarding 
discovery and strategy; draft letter to opposing counsel regarding same. 
c.J1 81312012 lhomas E. Dvorak 0.40 260.00 104.00 Office conference regarding status. 
00 8/6/2012 homas E. Dvorak 0.40 260.00 104.00 Review and revise letter regarding deposition and deposition ducas tecum. 
c..O 81812012 homas E. Dvorak 0.50 260.00 130.00 Finalize notice of deposition of Greenheart; communicate with Vactor Villigas regarding 
same. 
8/9/2012 ihomas E. Dvorak 1.80 260.00 468.00 Communicate with Victor Villegas regarding deposition; legal research on statute of 
limitations; draft status report to client; office conference regarding same. 
8/10/2012 lhomas E. Dvorak 0.20 260.00 52.00 Receive and review notice of change of address of Villegas. 
8/14/2012 homas E. Dvorak 0.30 260.00 78.00 Office conference regarding status; receive and review letter regarding setting of 
deposition. 
8/17/2012 homas E. Dvorak 0.30 260.00 78.00 Draft status update and e-mail regarding consent to deposition dates. 
8/24/2012 homas E. Dvorak 0.20 260.00 52.00 Review status of continued deposition. 
8127/2012 homas E. Dvorak 0.40 260.00 104.00 Prepare stipulation for scheduling. 
8/2812012 homas E. Dvorak 0.20 260.00 52.00 Finalize and file stipulation for scheduling and planning. 
9/19/2012 homas E. Dvorak 0.50 260.00 130.00 Receive and review scheduling order; forward same to client with analysis. 
9/1912012 homas E. Dvorak 0.40 260.00 104.00 Receive and review scheduling order; draft email to clients updating status. 
10/24/2012 homas E. Dvorak 4.60 260.00 1, 196.00 Review discovery and outline deposition of Greenhart. 
10/2512012 homas E. Dvorak 0.10 260.00 26.00 Prepare for deposition; e-mail client 
10/26/2012 homas E. Dvorak 7.40 260.00 1,924.00 Prepare for and take deposition of Augusta Greenhart. 
10/29/2012 homas E. Dvorak 0.50 260.00 130.00 Office conference regarding deposition and strategy; telephone conference with Jay 
Brown. 
1112/2012 lhomas E. Dvorak 1.50 260.00 390.00 Telephone conference with Karla Post regarding potential expert testimony; draft .. 
affidavit of Karla Postdraft e-mail to Karla Post telephone conference Jay Brown; 
telephone message Vidor VIiiegas. 
111512012 romas E. Dvorak 0.50 260.00 130.00 Telephone conference Terri Manduca regarding potential testimony. 
11/6/2012 homas E. Dvorak 1.40 260.00 364.00 Draft summary judgment legal research regarding same. 
1117/2012 homas E. Dvorak 2.80 260.00 728.00 Draft memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment legal research 
regarding same. 
11/8/2012 lhomas E. Dvorak 1.50 260.00 390.00 Receive and review signature on agreement to extend expert witness deadlines and 
execute and file same; draft memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment 
11/912012 lhomas E. Dvorak 0.80 260.00 208.00 Participate in telephone conference with Judge Norton; telephone measage Darin 
Rhead regarding documents. 
11/1212012 Thomas E. Dvorak 1.00 260.00 260.00 Receive and review first round of discovery from Plaintiff; respond to same; 
conference Terri Manduca. 
11/1912012 Thomas E. Dvorak 4.40 260.00 1, 144.00 Draft Memorandum in Support of motion for summary judgment draft affidavit of 
Thomas E. Dvorak; legal l'9$84lrch on laches;telephone conference with Terri Manduca 
(2x); draft affidavit of Terri; draft expert witness d~. 
11/20/2012 Thomas E. Dvorak 2.40 260.00 624.00 Draft memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment; draft affidavit of Jay 
Brown. 
1112112012 homas E. Dvorak 0.70 260.00 182.00 Office conference regarding sqatus and strategy; respond to e-mail from client 
121712012 homas E. Dvorak 0.80 260.00 208.00 Review and revise discovery responses; telephone conference Jay Brown regarding 
""" same (2x). <.O 12/1112012 homas E. Dvorak 0.50 260.00 130.00 Telephone conference with Victor Villegas regarding di&covery. office conference 
0 regarding same. 
12/1412012 homas E. Dvorak 0.80 260.00 208.00 Office conference regarding discovery. legal research on opposition to summary 
judgment brief. 
1211612012 ras E. Dvorak 2.10 260.00 546. 00 Legal research on opposition to motion for summary judgment; draft same. 
12/1912012 homas E. Dvorak 0.40 260.00 104.00 Receive and review expert witness disclosure of Defendant 
12120/2012 homas E. Dvorak 0.70 260.00 182.00 Review and revise memorandum in opposition to motion for summary judgment 
1212212012 homas E. Dvorak 0.30 260.00 78.00 Review defendanrs motion to strike and related filings. 
12/2712012 homas E. Dvorak 0.40 260.00 104.00 Office conference regarding drafting reply brief in support of summary judgment; review 
brief filed by Greenheart and motion to strike. 
12130/2012 romas E. Dvorak 0.90 260.00 234.00 Review and revise reply brief; legal research on objective manifestation of intent 
1213112012 homas E. Dvorak 0.90 260.00 234.00 Draft portion of reply brief; office conference regarding same. 
1/812013 homas E. Dvorak 0.40 275.00 110.00 Office conference regarding status; telephone conference Jay Brown regarding 
proceeding to trial. 
1/10/2013 lhomas E. Dvorak 0.40 275.00 110.00 Review witness disclosure list; office conference regarding status. 
1/1812013 homas E. Dvorak 0.40 275.00 110.00 Finalize witness disclosure; receive and review same from Vidor VIiiegas. 
2/812013 lJlomas E. Dvorak 0.80 275.00 220.00 Telephone conference with client regarding import of decision and mediation 
potential;draft e-mail to opposing counsel regarding same; office conference regarding 
elements of mistake and quasi &Stoppel. 
2/11/2013 llhomas E. Dvorak 0.50 275.00 137.50 Review status; telephone message to opposing counsel regarding mediation and trial; 
office conference regarding mediation. 
2/15/2013 llhomas E. Dvorak 0.40 275.00 11 o.oo Telephone conference Jay Brown regarding status; office conference regarding 
mistake. 
2120/2013 lhomas E. Dvorak 3.20 275.00 880.00 Draft opposition to motion for reconsideration and motion to shorten time; legal 
research regarding same; draft witness list 
212212013 lhomas E. Dvorak 3.80 275.00 1,045.00 Prepare for and travel to Mountain Home for hearing and pretrial; Meeting with Jay 
Brown; participate in pretrial. 
2125/20131homas E. Dvorak 0.50 275.00 137.50 Telephone conference with Terry Manduca regarding potential testimony. 
212612013 homas E. Dvorak 3.40 275.00 935.00 Review and summarize Greenheart Deposition; telephone conference with Jay 
regarding status and decision on calling Terry Manducca;office conference 
same; outline testimony; telephone conference with Christine. 
212712013 lhomas E. Dvorak 1.50 275.00 412.50 Receive and review defendanfs proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law;telephone conference with opposing counsel regarding exhibits; receive and review 
telephone conference Jay regarding same. 
212812013 Thomas E. Dvorak 2.70 275.00 742.50 Go over exhibits and outline trial strategy and ciosing arguments; outline testimony of 
CJ't 
greenheart; legal research for brief on admission of post contract conduct to prove 
C.D 
mistake. 
I'- 31112013 ~E. Dvorak 2.30 275.00 632.50 Meeting with Jay Brown to prepare testimony; prepare for trial. 
3/4/2013 homas E. Dvorak 2.50 275.00 687.50 Draft pretrial brief and motion in limine and memorandum in support; telephone 
conference with expert witness; prepare for trial and go over exhibits. 
3/512013 homas E. D1Jorak 9.70 275.00 2,667.50 Prepare for and attend trial in Mountain Horne; travel to and from trial. 
3/612013 homas E. Dvorak 5.50 275.00 1,512.50 Prepare for trial day 2; travel to and from mountain home; participate in trial. 
312812013 homas E. Dvorak 0.60 275.00 165.00 Receive and review transcript of trial. 
4/412013 homas E. Dvorak 1.30 275.00 357. 50 Draft revised findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
4n12013 homas E. Dvorak 1.50 275.00 412.50 Review and revise proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
4/812013 homas E. Dvorak 3.10 275.00 852.50 Review and revise and draft amended findings of fact and conclusions of law req 
5/14/2013 homas E. Dvorak 1.80 275.00 495.00 Receive and review Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law and Directions for Entry of 
Judgment; draft judgment and letter to court; telephone conference with client regarding 
same; outline and research memorandum of costs and attorneys fees. 
511512013 romas E. Dvorak 0.50 275.00 137.50 Draft judgment and cover letter. 
5/1612013 homas E. Dvorak 1.40 275.00 385.00 Draft attorneys fees application and affidavit and verified memorandum. 
512712013 homas E. Dvorak 1.80 275.00 495.00 Review and revise and draft memorandum in support of costs and fees; legal research 
5/2812013 homas E. D'lorak 
on merger doctrine and attorneys fees. 
0.50 275.00 137.50 Review and revise attorneys fees aoDlication. 
T9tai. for Th maa E. Dvorak - Working 28,005.50 
.. 
21612013 Alex Mclaughlin 2.70 185.00 499.50 Analyze Court's Memorandum Decision re: Summary Judgment, pleadings, and the law-
applicable to mutual mistake and quasi-estoppel. Draft memorandum regarding same. 
Submit to TED for review. Meeting with TEO to discuss application of my analysis to 
the facts of our case. 
211512013 Alex Mclaughlin 0.30 185.00 55.50 Meeting with TEO to discuss strategy behind and validity of our argument regarding 
mutual mistake. 
212212013 xex Mclaughlin 0.30 185.00 55.50 Trial preparation with TED. 
212312013 lex Mclaughlin 1.30 185.00 240.50 Analyze legal issue of whether evidence that a party was mistaken after the contract 
was entered into bears on whether that same mistake was harbored at the time of 
contracting. 
212812013 Alex Mclaughlin 5.10 185.00 943.50 Draft pre-trial memorandum addressing mutual mistake, the specificity of Defendants' 
expert witness disclosures, and the rule that testimony may not be admitted to prove 
the Intent of an unambiguous contract. 
3/1/2013 &lex Mclaughlin 0.30 185.00 55.50 Meeting with TED to discuss content of ore-trial brief and trial stra 
1,850.00 
3/23/2012 ric B. Nelson 0.70 175.00 122.50 Research public records regarding deeds in the title chain. 
3/2612012 ric B. Nelson 0.40 175.00 70.00 Teleconference with title officer regarding deeds and lot book guarantee. 
3/2712012 ric B. Nelson 0.80 175.00 140.00 Research public records and review title documents. 
6/1812012 ric B. Nelson 3.90 175.00 682.50 l al descri tion anal sis document review. oublic records research. 
Jotala for Eri B. Nelson - Working 1,015.00 
tO 
N 5/17/2012 ijisa Nicholas 3.70 135.00 499.50 Review complaint and answer in preparation of first set of discovery; prepare 
interrogatories, requests for production of documents and requests for admissions. 
7/26/2012 ~isa Nicholas 0.50 135.00 67.50 Prepare letter to opposing counsel regarding deposition of Ms. Greenheart. 
10/2412012 isa Nicholas 1.90 135.00 256.50 Review documents provided by client and defendant to be used as exhibits at the 
deposition of Defendant 
11/612012 llisa Nicholas 1.50 135.00 202.50 Prepare second set of discovery and notice of service to defendant; prepare letter to 
clerk for filing and serve upon defendant 
12/512012 ra Nicholas 2.10 135.00 283.50 Begin preparation of discovery responses. 
121612012 isa Nicholas 3.70 135.00 499.50 Work on discovery responses. 
1217/2012 isa Nicholas 3.20 135.00 432.00 Finalize discovery; prepare and Bates No. documents for production; prepare notice of 
service of discovery. 
2113/2013 llisa Nicholas 5.50 135.00 742.50 Prepare request to supplement discovery responses and notice of service; prepare 
email to expert regarding trial date; prepare trial witness list; begin preparation of trial 
exhibits list and designating exhibits. 
211412013 ra Nicholas 2.70 135.00 364.50 Prepare draft findings of facts and conclusions of law in preparation for trial. 
2120/2013 isa Nicholas 3.10 135.00 418.50 Work on trial preparation, witness list, exhibit list, etc. 
212112013 isa Nicholas 3.90 135.00 526.50 Work on prepare exhibits and exhibit list for trial; telephone call with expert to set time 
for pretrial meeting. 
212212013 isa Nicholas 5.80 135.00 
2128/2013 isa Nicholas 2.10 135.00 
3/112013 isa Nicholas 5.70 135.00 
3/412013 isa Nicholas 5.20 135.00 
3/512013 isa Nicholas 10.50 135.00 
3/612013 isa Nicholas 7.50 135.00 
Totale for Lie. Nleholae - Working 
Total feq fo~Jay B. Brown I Quiet Tltla ·A. Greanhaart 
(11543 / 3) 
Total feq fod11543·2 
Total Fees 
Total Costs 





783.00 Finalize witness list; exhibit list and create binders of exhibits to be used at trial. ,,. 
283.50 Prepare stipulated joint exhibit list; prepare letter to Idaho Real Estate Commission to 
serve Daryl Rhead; telephone call with Idaho Real Estate Commission regarding 
service upon agent 
769.50 Work on trial preparation. 
702.00 Work on electronic trial presentation an loading of exhibits. 
1, 417. 50 Attend trial. 








Michael C. Creamer (Idaho State Bar ID # 4030) 
Thomas E. Dvorak (Idaho State Bar ID# 5043) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 




Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown 
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CLERK Of THE COURT 
OEPUT~ 
IN THE.DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON-
BROWN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO 
GREENHEART, an individual, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-353 
VERIFIED NOTICE OF ERRATA 
AND WITHDRAW AL OF PORTION 
OF CLAIMED ATTORNEYS FEES 
Comes now, Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, and hereby give notice of 
Errata in the Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak. 
Specifically, the entry for 2.6 hours of work by Michael C. Creamer ("MCC'') totaling 
$780.00 on 12131/2012 on the attachment to the Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak ("Affidavit") was a 
typographical error in that all of the activities described within that entry and within the earlier 
12/31/2012 entry of 2.5 hours would have taken place within either the 2.5 or 2.6 hour block of time 
according to the memory of Mr. Creamer. Mr. Creamer did not have a chance to review the 
Affidavit and attachment until after this Affidavit was filed. Accordingly, giving the benefit of the 
doubt to our clients, Givens Pursley LLP has written down the amount of the outstanding bill by 
VERIFIED NOTICE OF ERRATA AND WITHDRAW AL OF 




2.6 hours, $780.00, and now formally amends the Affidavit and the corresponding last page of the 
Verified Memorandum of Cost and Attorneys Fees ("Memorandum'') as follows: 
The following summary reflects the total amount of costs and 








The Browns should, in the interest of justice and under the 
laws ofldaho, be awarded their claimed costs in the amount of 
$2,356.58 and attorneys' fees in the amount of$58,413.50, for a total 
amount of $60, 770.08. 
Other than as set forth above, the Affidavit and Memorandum are and remain true and correct 
and in effect as of the original date they were filed. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to me this ~ day of June, 2013. 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Residing at Meridian, Ada County 
My Commission Expires: //- So-~17 
VERIFIED NOTICE OF ERRATA AND WITHDRAWAL OF 
PORTION OF CLAIMED ATTORNEYS FEES • 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 5ty of June, 2013, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated: 
Victor Villegas 
Borton & Lakey 
141 E. Carlton Avenue 






PURSUANT TO COURT'S ORDER- JUDGE'S COPY SENT VIA EMAIL 
lnorton@adaweb.net 
hfurst@3lmorecoµnty.org 
VERIFIED NOTICE OF ERRATA AND WITHDRAW AL OF 
PORTION OF CLAIMED ATTORNEYS FEES -3 
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.. ' , u n. 13. 2013 2: 01 PM st Culton Ave 
Joe Borton [ISB No. 5552] 
Victor Villcpl [ISB No. 5860] 
BORTON LADY LA w omCES 
141 B. C1t'1toa Avt. 
Merldtaa. m 83642 
Boise. Idaho 83702 
Oftlcc (208) 908-4415 
Fax: (208) 493-4610 
Email: victor@lmton-Jaby.com 
A.ttontl)'I /or Df/lntlant 
No. 5593 P. 2/6 
F\LEfJ 
'LU\3 JUH \ 3 PH 2: O~ 
BARBARA SlL£.lET 
CLERK Of lH~~* 
OEPUT''fCJ' 
IN TllE DISTRICT COVR.T or THE ro~TB J'UDICIAL DISTRICT 01' 
THI STATE or mABO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY or ELMORE 
JAY BR.OWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON· 
BR.OWN. Husband and Wife, 
v. 
AUOUSTASAYOKOMIMOTO 
OREBNHBAR.T, an individual, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CV 2012-353 
' MBMORA.NDVM IN 
OPPOSmONTO 
PLAINTD'n' APPLICATION 
FOR COSTS AND 
ATTORNEYS' FEES 
Defendant, Aupata Sa)')ko Mimoto Oreenheart, by and tbroqb. her attorneys of record, 
Victor Villegu and Borton Lakey Law OtBcee, submits this Memorandum h1 Opposition to 
Plaintitfs' .Application for Costl and Attom.eya' F111 filed May 30, 2013. 
L 
The Plaintitli ("Browm") seek m award of attorney feet bued on Idaho Code f 12· 
120(3) end punwmt to an attorney fees provision eontaJned h1 the Real Bltate Purcbuo and Sale 
Jqpeement. N set fbrm wwwe fiJHy !Jelaw, tile Browm ifti mt entttted tu m award ot atmmey 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLA.lNTIFFS' 
APPUCATION f~ COSTS ANDATIORNBYS' FBES· l 
. 597 
·. Jun. 13. 2013 2 : 01 PM st Culton Ave No. 5593 P. 3/6 
feet. in thia matt• because: (1) this cue did not involve a 'commarcial transaction' brinains the 
matter ads Idaho Code I 12·120(3) and; (2) the contraotual provtmna in the Real Bstat• 
Purchue ml Sale are inapplicable. 
U. ABQJJMINt 
A. Tllen 11 ao •commerctal tnmactloa" la tbll cue and tlaenfon attontyt fMI cuaot 
be awarded oder Idaho Code 112-120(3). 
Idaho Code f 12-120(3) allowa i>r 111 award of attormy fill to the pnsYlillns pany in a 
civil acdon to reoo\11." "in any commercial tramaction." A commercial tramaction includet all 
tnmsactiom except tboae fbr personal or household purpow. l.C. I 12-120(3). Jn detemrinin1 
whither attorney fees should be awarded under I.C. f ll-120(3), the Idaho Supreme Court bu 
conduc=tod a two-step analylil: "(1) there must be a 09mmercial transectio11 that !s intearaI to the 
claim; ml (2) the oommercia1 tramaction must be the bait upon which recovery i8 toqht." 
Gamv v. Pov.y, 1S1 Idaho 462, 469, 259 P.3d 608, 615 (2011). hcmtly the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Carrillo v. Bols11h Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 274 P.3d 1256, (2012) baa held that,•• ... 
m order fbr a ttamaction to be commercial. each party to the tramaction must enter the 
~ mr I commercia1 purpoae." Id. at Idaho 7!6. 
In this case. the evidence in the record and in partiCulat this Court'• fJndma1 of fict and 
conclusions demonstrate that thit ouo did not involve a commercial trmtaction. With respect to 
Orec:nbcart'a ability to dis a well, thia Court held that "At thotimeofthe Ille, Idaho Code If 42-
227 and 42-111 provided that no water right wu necesaery to operate: a well i>r ~meatic 
purpo• ... u a matter of law, there WU and ii a lepl meam too~ a well." Ftndlnp oj'Fact 
and Conclu.slon.r of Law PS. 16. To now hold that a "commercial trmaction" wu involved in 
thii cue wo\ild coiiiida t1iil Court's conciuaion. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSmON TO PLAINTIFFS' 
APPLICATION FOi. COSTS AND AITORNBYS' FEES· 2 
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The Browna a1ao arp that beeause Oreeaheart prepared and executed a dry arazjna 
lease with the Browm· that this conduct wu indicative of this lawsuit involvina a commercial 
tramaodon. On the contrary, the purpo11 of the dry srazina 1eaM wu solely to receive a 
reduction in taxes m:l not to receive any Income. Thia Court made the apeciflc findiq that the 
leue wu to pt a tax reduction in Pindiq of Pact No. 23. Perhaps the molt telllq lian that the 
dry arazjna lease waa not intended to mate a profit ia the dry srazina lease it811£ A review of 
tho hue, mmbd u Plaintift'1 Bxhibit 11, shows than there ii no monetary consideration to be 
paid by the Browm tbr the dry srazina lease. 
Thia lawsuit did not involve a commercJal transaction mi therefore attorney fee• ere not 
awardabie under Idaho Code f 12·120(3). 
B. Then II ao applicable contractual provllloa tlaat allowl for ID award of attorney~ fee1. 
As rm independent basis fur rm award of attorney fees, the Brown.I rely on Parqraph 9 of 
' 
the RE-24 Vacant Land Real Estate Purchase and Sale Aareement (Plaintiff"s Bxlubit 6) that 
reada: 
t. ATTORNEY'S FEES: If either party initiates or detendl any arbitration or lep1 
action or proceedins which are in any way connected with this Aareemem. the prevailina 
party shall be entitled to recover tom the non-prevailins party reuonable costs and 
attorney feel, including such costs and fisea on appeal. 
Paragraph 9 of the Purchase and Sale Asreement cannot form tho buil b' an award of 
attorney fees by this Court tbr two reasons. Pint, the sraveman 'of this lawsuit wu the 
interpretation of the Warranty Deed not the interpretation of en1brcement of the Purchase and 
Sale Agreement. In &ct this Court recopized that the terms of the contract were nmpd with 
the Wamnty Deed. Sa Mmorandum Dectllon On Summary Judgment Pl: 7. The Warranty 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAJNTIFFS' 
APPUCATION FOACOSTS ANDAITORNiYS' FEES· 3 
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•'* ' i 
Deed doea not contain any similar attom:y fcea provision u the Purchase am Salo Agremnent 
and thntbre there ii no contnct provilion that allows an award of attorney fcea. 
Second. eva if thia Court were to qree that the attorney feet provision of the Purchase 
and Sale Apement were to apply, that contractual provision ia too late. A.a Oreenheart raiaed in 
her Motion tbr Summary 1udament, tho statute of limitationa on an action i>unded upon a 
written contrict ii five years. J.C. I 5·216. Here, the PurcbaN and Sale Apement and 
Counterofti:r compriae the contmot 'bctwem the parties. Tho ''U-13 Colinteroffer" wu Jut 
siped OD January 9, 2007. Tho Complaint WU !led OD April 9, 2012. To be timely, the lawsuit 
. 
should have been filed on or before January 9, 2012. Th.e:refi>re. if thia action tNly involved tho 
interpretation of the Pmcbaae and Sale Apiem.ent which would trigar the attorney feet 
provisM>n of Parqraph 9 this lawsuit it too late and theretbre attorney fees cannot bo awarded. 
m. CONCLUSION 
Bued upon the arguments above, the Brown's request tbr attorney fcca in this matter 
should be denied. 
DATBD this 13*dayof1une, 2013. 
BORTON LAKEY LAW OPPICES 
By y~r_~ 
Victor Villeps 
A.ttomey,r for Dr/endant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON-
BROWN, Husband and Wife, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 
GREENHEART, an individual, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
CASE NO. CV 2012-353 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, JAY BROWN AND CHRISTINE HOPSON-
BROWN, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS, GIVENS PURSLEY LLP, PO BOX 2720, BOISE, 
IDAHO 83701-2720, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, Augusta Sayoko Mimoto Greenheart, by and 
through her counsel of record, Borton Lakey Law Offices, appeals against the above-named 
Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the District Court's Judgment entered on May 23, 
2013. 
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2. Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court on the grounds that 
the orders and judgment descnbed in paragraph 1 above are appealable pursuant to l.A.R. 
1 l(a)(l). 
3. Following is a preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which Appellant 
intends to assert. This list of issues shall not prevent the Appellant from asserting other issues on 
appeal The District Court for the Fourth Judicial District in and for the County of Elmore made 
the following errors of law: 
(a) Did the district court err in permitting Respondents to assert "mutual 
mistake" without having pled that cause of action in their Complaint? 
(b) Did the district court err in concluding that the Complaint met the 
requirements of pleading mistake with particularity as required by IRCP 9(b)? 
( c) Did the district court err finding that Respondent's cause of action was not 
barred by the statute of limitations under Idaho Code Sections 5-224 and/or 5-216? 
(d) Did the district court err finding that Respondent's cause of action was not 
barred by the statute of limitations under Idaho Code Section 5-218? 
(e) Did the district court err in allowing extrinsic evidence to interpret the 
Warranty Deed? 
(t) Did the district court err in holding that the Purchase and Sale Agreement 
was ambiguous? 
(g) Did the district court err in excluding Appellant's expert witnesses? 
(h) Did the district court err in finding that Respondents were able to meet the 
"clear and convincing" standard necessary for finding mutual mistake? 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
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5. Appellant requests preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript: 
(a) Summary Judgment Hearing on January 7, 2013; 
(b) Hearing on Motion to Shorten Time and Motion to Strike Portions of 
Affidavit of Jay B. Brown and Terri Manduca on January 7, 2013; 
(c) Status Conference on January 7, 2013; 
(d) Pre-Trial Conference on February 22, 2013; 
(e) Hearing on Motion to Shorten Time to Hear Motion in Limine on March 
5, 2013; and 
(f) Trial testimony on March 5 and 6, 2013. 
6. Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR: 
No. Filed Description 
1 04-05-12 Comnlaint 
2 04-05-12 Summons 
3 05-09-12 Answer 
4 08-13-12 Order for Scheduling Conference and Order Re: Motion Practice 
5 08-28-12 Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning 
6 09-17-12 Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing Further Proceedings 
7 11-05-12 Motion to Extend Expert Witness Deadlines 
8 11-05-12 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Extend Expert Witness Deadlines 
9 11-05-12 Agreement to Extend Expert Witness Deadlines and Withdrawal of Motion 
10 11-15-12 Defendant's Motion for s ... i Judgment 
11 11-15-12 Memorandum in Suooort of Defendant's Motion for S y Judgment 
12 11-15-12 Defendant's Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
13 11-16-12 Affidavit of Augusta Sayoko Mimoto Greenheart in Support of Motion for 
et ·-~ .. --~-v Ju.dument 
14 12-10-12 Motion for s. .y Judgment 
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No. Filed Description 
15 12-10-12 Affidavit of Jay R. Brown in Sunnort of Motion for S· '"' Y Judlllllent 
16 12-10-12 Affidavit of Terri LaRae Manduca 
17 12-10-12 Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judament 
~ 18 12-19-12 Defendant's Disclosure of Expert Witnesses 
19 12-21-12 Memorandum in Om>osition to Plaintiffs' Motion for S "" y Judament 
20 12-21-12 Defendant's Statement of Material Facts in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
s". . J Judament 
21 12-21-12 Affidavit of Augusta Sayoko Mimoto Oreenheart in Support of Defendant's 
Om>osition to s ....... :r Judament 
22 12-21-12 Affidavit of Kenneth Brush in Support of Defendant's Opposition to 
s., .. ; Judlllllent 
23 12-21-12 Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of Jay B. Brown and 
Terri LaRae Manduca 
24 12-21-12 Defendant's Motion to Shorten Time to Hear Their Motion to Strike 
Portions of Affidavit of Jay B. Brown and Terri LaRae Manduca 
25 12-21-12 Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of 
Affidavit of Jay B. Brown and Terri LaRae Manduca 
26 12-24-12 Memorandum in Om>osition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judlllllent 
27 12-28-12 Reoly in Suooort of Defendant's Motion for s- ,.,;---y Judlllllent 
28 12-31-12 Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of 
Affidavit of Jay B. Brown and Terri LaRae Manduca 
29 01-18-13 Defendant's Disclosure of Lay Witnesses 
30 01-31-13 ·Order Denying Summary Judgment on Court I and Granting in Part 
Su.l..U.LU.QI.;; Judlllllent for Defendant on Count II 
31 02-15-13 Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration 
32 02-15-13 Memorandum in Suooort of Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration 
33 02-15-13 Defendant's Motion in Limine to Preclude Allegations of Mistake 
34 02-15-13 Defendant's Motion to Shorten Time to Hear Motion for Reconsideration 
and Motion in Limine 
35 02-21-13 Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Shorten Time 
to Hear Motion for Reconsideration and Motion in Limine 
36 02-21-13 Motion to Amend 
j/ U:l-:ll-U Motion to :snorten lune to Hear Mot10n to Amend 
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No. Filed Deseripdon 
38 02-22-13 Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit List 
39 02-22-13 Plaintiffs' Trial Witness List 
40 02-22-13 Plaintiffs' Proposed Findina of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
41 02-25-13 Defendant's Proposed Findina of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
42 02-25-13 Defendant's Trial Witness List 
43 02-25-13 Defendant's Trial Exlu"bit List 
44 02-27-13 Defendant's Amended Trial Exhibit List 
45 03-04-13 Pre-Trial BriefRe: Post Conveyance Evidence of Mutual Mistake and 
Purchase Aueement as Evidence of Mistake 
46 03-04-13 Motion in Limine 
47 03-04-13 Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine 
48 03-04-13 Motion to Shorten Time to Hear Motion in Limine 
49 04-08-13 Defendant's First Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law 
so 04-08-13 Plaintiffs' Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
51 05-13-13 Findina of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Directions for Entry of Jud2Illent 
52 05-23-13 Jud2Illent 
53 05-31-13 Plaintiffs' Application for Costs and Attorneys' Fees 
54 05-31-13 Plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees 
55 05-31-13 Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak in Support of Plaintiffs' Verified 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees 
56 06-07-13 Verified Notice of Errata and Withdrawal of Portion of Claimed Attorneys' 
Fees 
57 06-13-13 Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Application for Costs and 
Attorneys' Fees 
7. The undersigned hereby certified: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
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Penny Tardiff 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, ID 83702-7300 
March.5, 2013 
February 22, 2013 
January 7, 2013 
Heather Furst 
clo Hon. Lynn G. Norton 
Elmore County Courthouse 
150 S. 4th E., Ste. 5 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
(b) That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid $100.00 for the fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript, to be held as a bond until the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript has been determined, at which time it will be paid in full 
(c) That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid $100.00 for the clerk's 
record, to be held as a bond until the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been 
determined, at which time it will be paid in full. 
( d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant . . 
to 1.A.R. 20. 
DATED this 27th day of June, 2013. 
BORTON LAKEY LAW OFFICES 
By 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERYl~E 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of June, 2013, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax 
transmission to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person 
in charge of the office as indicated below: 
Michael C. Creamer 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
GIVENS PuRsLEY ll.P 
P.O. Box. 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
Victor Villegas ~ 
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IN nm DISTRICT COURT OF nm FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR nm COUNTY OF ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON-
BROWN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SAYOKO MIMOTO 
GREENHEART, an individual, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-353 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART 
PLAINTIFF'S FEES AND COSTS 
The Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees Under IRCP 54(e)(7) and the Plaintiff's 
Application for Costs and Fees came before the court for oral argument on August 5, 2013. 
Thomas E. Dvorak appeared telephonically for the Plaintiffs and the Defendant was represented 
by Victor Villegas in person. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACK.GROUND 
This trial involved a dispute regarding whether a deed for the conveyance of land 
executed by Plaintiffs Jay Brown and Christine Hopson-Brown in favor of Defendant Greenheart 
operated to convey not only the described land but also the water rights appurtenant to the land at 
the time of the conveyance. The Court summarized and analyzed the facts and law applicable to 
this case in a previous summary judgment decision and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Direction for Entry of Judgment.1 The Court adopts those facts and law in this 
decision. 
1 Order Denying Summary Judameot on Cmmt I and Qrantjng in Part Summary lmlpw'M fel g1f1Rtl:ant eft Celtnt 
II, filed 1/31/2013; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Directions for Entry of Judgment, filed 5/10/2013. 
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This action was initiated by Plaintiffs on April 5, 2012. Plaintiffs asserted two causes of 
action against Greenheart in the Complaint to Quiet Title: Count 1 requested a declaratory 
judgment on contract interpretation and Count 2 requested a declaratory judgment under the 
principles of promissory estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and/or waiver. Greenheart answered without 
filing any counterclaims. 
In its January 31, 2013 decision on cross motions for summary judgment, this Court 
granted summary judgment in part and denied summary judgment in part. 2 In its May 10, 2013 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Directions for Entry of Judgment, this Court found in 
favor of Plaintiffs on Count 1 for Contract Interpretation, and Count 2 for Quasi-Estoppel and 
Waiver.3 The only theory on which the Court did not affirmatively find in favor of Plaintiffs was 
Count 2 for promissory estoppel. 
Plaintiffs now move this Court for an award of costs and attorney fees incurred in this 
matter as a result of obtaining the declaratory judgment they sought in this action.4 After the 
motion was filed, Plaintiffs noticed the Court there was an error in the amount of attorney's fees 
requested and withdrew a portion of the claimed fees.5 Greenheart opposed the motion, arguing 
only that Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney's fees. 6 Plaintiffs responded by filing a motion for 
an award of attorney's fees under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e )(7). 7 
The Court considered Plaintiffs' Application for Costs and Fees; Plaintiffs' Verified 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees; the Verified Notice of Errata and Withdrawal of 
Portion of Qaimed Attorneys Fees; the Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Application for 
Costs and Attorneys' Fees; the Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees Requested Per IRCP 
54( e )(7); the Memorandum in Support of Rule 54( e X7) Motion for Entry of an Award of 
Attorneys Fees; and the affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak (5/31/2013). 
2 See generally Order Denying Summary Judgment on Count I and Granting in Part Summary Judgment for 
Defendant on Count II, filed 1/31/2013. 
3 See generally Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Directions for Entry of Judgment. 
4 See generally Plaintiffs' Application for Costs and Fees, filed 5/31/2013; Plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of 
Costs and Attorneys' Fees (hereinafter "Plaintiffs' Verified Memo. Costs and Fees"), filed 5/31/2013. 
5 See generally Verified Notice of Errata and Withdrawal of Portion ofaaimed Attorneys Fees, filed 6n/2013. 
6 See generally Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Application for Costs and Attorneys' Fees (hereinafter 
''Greenheart's Memo. in Opp. to Costs and Fees"), filed 6/13/2013. 
7 See generally Motion for Award ofAttgmcp' fees Requested Pn IQCR 54(e)(7), tiltd <i'l4Q01li U11R8NfttMtm 
in Support of Rule 54(e)(7) Motion for Entry of an Award of Attorneys Fees, filed 6/24/2013. 
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LEGAL STANDARD 
First, regarding awarding costs as a matter of right, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(dXl)(A) sets forth that "costs shall be allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party or 
parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court." Second, the court has the discretion to add items 
of cost or increase the amount of the costs allowed ''upon a showing that said costs were 
necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be 
assessed against the adverse party." I.RC.P. 54(d)(lXD). Finally, regarding awarding reasonable 
attorney fees, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(eX1) sets forth that "[i]n any civil action the 
court may award reasonable attorney fees, which at the discretion of the court may including 
paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided 
for by any statute or contract." These standards are reiterated and elaborated upon under the 
applicable sections of the Court's analysis below. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Whether Greenheart Waived her Right to Object to the Costs and Fees 
Requested by Not Filing a Motion to Disallow. 
Plaintiffs contend Greenheart waived her right to object to their requested costs and fees 
because she opposed their motion for costs and fees with a memorandum in opposition of costs 
and fees instead of filing a motion to disallow costs and fees. 8 Plaintiffs point to the language of 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(6) which states: 
Any party may object ... by filing ... a motion to disallow part or all of such costs 
within fourteen (14) days of service of the memorandum of cost. ... Failure to 
timely object to the items in the memorandum of costs shall constitute a waiver of 
all objections to the costs claimed. 
Rule 54(e)(6) applies this same rule to any objection to the allowance of attorney fees. Finally, 
Plaintiffs cite two cases which essentially reiterate the language of this rule under facts not on 
point with this case. The Plaintiff cites two cases. Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 804, 241 
P.3d 972, 977 (2010), concluded a party waived any objections to the costs claimed when they 
did not file a timely objection an d Templeton v. Hogue, 125 Idaho 130, 130- 131, 867 P.2d 
1004, 1004-1005 (Ct. App. 1994) concluding an objection was waived where they did not file a 
written objection but appeared at the hearing. 
8 Memorandum in Support of Rule 54( e )(7) Motion for Entry of an Award of Attorneys Fees, pp. 2-3. 
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In this case, unlike in Bagley and Templeton, it is undisputed that Greenheart actually 
filed a written memorandum with the Court within the required 14 days of service of the 
memorandum of costs objecting to Plaintiffs' claimed fees. This Court will not elevate form over 
substance by denying Greenheart' s timely written objections simply because she did not style her 
writing as a "motion to disallow costs and fees." Elevating form over substance is disfavored by 
Idaho courts. See e.g. In re Weick, 142 Idaho 275, 279, 127 P.3d 178, 182 (2005). Rule l(a) 
demands that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure "be liberally construed to secure the just, 
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.,, Greenheart filed a 
timely written memorandum is sufficient to preserve her objections to Plaintiffs' motion for costs 
and fees. 
Therefore, the Court considers Greenheart's objections below. 
IL Whether Plaintilh are the prevailing party In this litigation. 
Plaintiffs contend they were the prevailing party in this matter.9 Greenheart does not 
dispute Plaintiffs' contention. As explained above, after a bench trial, the Court found in favor of 
Plaintiffs on each of their causes of action and theories, with the exception of promissory 
estoppel. The Court directed judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiffs in connection with the 
judgment, the Court declared Plaintiffs the prevailing party and stated they were entitled to costs. 
To determine whether a party is a prevailing party, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(d)(l)(D) provides: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, 
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of 
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court 
in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part 
and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between 
and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the 
issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments 
obtained. 
Further, ''the prevailing party question is examined and determined from an overall view, not a 
claim-by-claim analysis." Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 538, 224 P.3d 1125, 1127 
(2010). 
Here, as set forth above, Plaintiffs prevailed at the bench trial, obtaining the declaratory 
judgment they sought in their action. Greenheart did not assert any counterclaims against 
9 Plaintiffs' Verified Memo. Costs and Fees, pp. 1-2. 
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Plaintiffs and Greenheart successfully defended against only Plaintiffs' theory of promissory 
estoppel. Therefore, Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in this action. 
IIL Whether Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of costs as a matter of right 
under Idaho Rule of Civil procedure 54(d)(l)(C). 
Plaintiffs move this Court for an award of $973.05 in costs as a matter of right under 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(C).10 These costs are separated into four categories: (1) 
court filing fees; (2) service of process; (3) preparation of materials admitted into evidence at the 
trial; and (4) reporting and transcribing fees for Greenheart's depositions.11 Greenheart does not 
dispute Plaintiffs are entitled to these costs as a matter of right. 
Regarding awarding costs as a matter of right Rule 54(d)(l)(A) sets forth "costs shall be 
allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the 
court." Rule 54(d)(l)(C) lists the costs which a prevailing party is entitled to as a matter of right. 
Rule 54(d)(l)(C)(l) provides for court filing fees; Rule 54(d)(l)(C)(2) provides for fees for 
service of any pleading; Rule 54(d)(l)(C)(6) provides for "[r]easonable costs of the preparation 
of models, maps, pictures, photographs, or other exhibits admitted in evidence as exhibits in a 
hearing or trial of an action, but not to exceed the sum of $500 for all of such exhibits of each 
party;" and Rule 54(d)(l)(C)(9) provides for reporting and transcribing depositions. 
The Court concludes Plaintiffs' requested costs fall squarely under those allowed. 
Although the request for trial materials was not specifically delineated, there were maps, 
photographs and other exhibits admitted at trial. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for 
costs and fees to the extent it requests $973.05 in costs as a matter of right. 
IV. Whether Plaintiffs will be awarded discretionary costs. 
Plaintiffs move this Court for an award of $1,383.53 in discretionary costs under Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(D).12 These costs are separated into six categories: (1) $160.00 
for serving expenses for attempts to locate and serve realtor Darryl Rhead, who could not be 
found; (2) $385.25 for a copy of the transcript of the trial to provide an Amended Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law for the Court; (3) $125.00 for a title insurance policy litigation 
report associated with filing a lis pendens on the property; (4) $16.00 for lis pendens recording 
10 Plaintiffs' Verified Memo. Costs and Fees, p. 2. 
II/, 
Id., pp. 2-3. 
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fees; (5) $489.13 for Westlaw research; and (6) $208.15 for photocopies.13 Greenheart does not 
dispute that Plaintiffs should be awarded these discretionary costs. 
Discretionary costs are at the court's discretion, but are only allowed ''upon a showing 
that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the 
interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party." I.R.C.P. 54(dXl)(D). Further, 
The trial court, in ruling upon objections to such discretionary costs contained in 
the memorandum of costs, shall make express findings as to why such specific 
item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed. In the absence of any 
objection to such an item of discretionary costs, the court may disallow on its own 
motion any such items of discretionary costs and shall make express findings 
supporting such disallowance. 
Id. In short, "[t]he trial court must make express findings as to why a party's discretionary costs 
should or should not be allowed." Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 
314, 109 P.3d 161, 168 (2005). The Court must make "[e]xpress findings as to the general 
character of requested costs and whether such costs are necessary, reasonable, exceptional, and 
in the interests of justice." Id. The Idaho Supreme Court described the "exceptional" requirement 
as follows: 
·This Court has always construed the requirement that a cost be "exceptional" 
under I.R.C.P. 54(dX1Xo) to include those costs incurred because the nature of 
the case was itself exceptional .... Certain cases, such as personal injury,(sic) 
cases generally involve copy, travel and expert witness fees such that these costs 
are considered ordinary rather than "exceptional" under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). 
Id. Such discretionary costs may include '"long distance phone calls, photocopying, faxes, travel 
expenses' and additional costs for expert witnesses." Id. 
Plaintiffs state the claimed discretionary costs were necessarily and reasonably incurred 
by Plaintiffs in prosecuting their claims against Greenheart.14 Plaintiffs also state the costs were 
exceptional to this litigation as set forth in the Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak. 15 The Court 
analyzes each expense in tum below. 
First, the $160.00 for serving expenses for attempts to locate and serve realtor Darryl 
Rhead were necessary even though this case proceeded through trial without Darryl Rhead. 
Although not named as a party, Mr. Rhead was the dual agent for the contract and sale at issue in 
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and exceptional because of the nature of this case. The fact that Mr. Rhead was not ultimately 
located and did not appear as a witness or party in this case does not make his presence in this 
case any less necessary or exceptional. Therefore, the Court GRANTS this $160.00 as a 
discretionary cost. 
Second, although the $385.25 for a copy of the transcript of the trial may have been 
convenient to assist in the preparation of proposed findings, the court does not find it was 
necessary or exceptional as cases frequently involve focus on testimony in providing matters to 
the Court. Third, the $125.00 for the title policy litigation report, $16.00 for lis pendens 
recording, and $208.15 for photocopies similarly may have been necessary but are ordinary costs 
of civil litigation, especially litigation which involves disputes over land and its appurtenances. 
Finally, the Court will consider the $489.13 for Westlaw research under the research attorney 
fees section below as a factor under Rule 54(eX3). 
The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for costs and fees to the extent it requests $160.00 
for service of Mr. Rhead but DENIES the remaining $1,223.53 in discretionary costs. 
V. Whether Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees. 
Plaintiffs move this Court for an award of $58,413.50 in reasonable attorney's fees. 16 
This sum is separated into five categories: (1) $19,062 incurred by Michael C. Creamer; (2) 
$28,005.50 incurred by Thomas E. Dvorak; (3) $1,850.00 incurred by Alex McLaughlin; (4) 
$1,015.00 incurred by Eric B. Nelson, a paralegal; and (5) $9,261.00 incurred by Lisa Nicholas, 
a paralegal.17 Regarding awarding reasonable attorney fees, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54( e Xl) sets forth that "[i]n any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, which 
at the discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as 
defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by any statute or contract." 
Plaintiffs provide two separate bases for awarding attorney fees: (1) the commercial 
transaction provision of Idaho Code § 12-120(3); and (2) Paragraph 9 of the Vacant Land Real 
Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement.18 Greenheart disputes awarding attorney fees under either 
of these bases because: (1) the gravamen of this lawsuit was not a "commercial transaction" as 
defined under Idaho Code § 12-120(3); and (2) Paragraph 9 of the Vacant Land Real Estate 
16 The Plaintiffs initially requested $59,193.50 in attorney's fees but subsequently filed a Verified Notice of Errata 
and Withdrawal of Portion of Oaimed Attorneys Fees which reduced the request to $58,413.50. 
17 Dvorak Aft '5/31/201J). Ex. A 
18 Plaintiffs' Verified Memo. Costs and Fees, pp. 3-6. 
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Purchase and Sale Agreement was merged with the Warranty Deed and the statute of limitations 
has passed.19 The Court addresses these contentions in tum below. 
A. Plaindffs are endtled to attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). 
Plaintiffs contend their action qualifies as a civil action to recover on a commercial 
transaction under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) because the gravamen of the lawsuit was the sale and 
conveyance of real property and water rights to Greenheart as an investment.20 Under Idaho 
Code § 12-120(3), the prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorney's fee set by the court 
"[i]n any civil action to recover on ... any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by 
law." The tenn "commercial transaction" includes "all transactions except transactions for 
personal or household purposes." I.C. § 12-120(3). The scope of the commercial transaction rule 
has been an object of continuous consideration by the Idaho appellate courts. In what has become 
the seminal case on awarding attorney fees pursuant to the commercial transaction statute, the 
Idaho Supreme Court summarized: 
[T]he award of attorney's fees is not warranted every time a commercial 
transaction is remotely connected with the case. Rather, the test is whether the 
commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit. Attorney's fees 
are not appropriate under I.C. § 12-120(3) unless the commercial transaction is 
integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting 
to recover. To hold otherwise would be to convert the award of attorney's fees 
from an exceptional remedy justified only by statutory authority to a matter of 
right in virtually every lawsuit filed. 
Brower v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345, 349 (1990). 
More recently, the Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged and clarified the following: 
From time to time the Court has denied fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) on the 
commercial transaction ground either because the claim sounded in tort or 
because no contract was involved. The commercial transaction ground in I.C. § 
12-120(3) neither prohibits a fee award for a commercial transaction that involves 
tortious conduct, nor does it require there be a contract. Any previous holdings to 
the contrary are overruled. 
Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, UC, 143 Idaho 723, 728-729, 152 P.3d 594, 599-600 (2007). 
The commercial transaction must be "between the prevailing party and the party from whom that 
party seeks fees." Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Const. & Trucking, Inc., 151 Idaho 761, 778, 264 
P.3d 400, 417 (2011) (quoting Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 327, 256 P.3d 730, 735 
19 See genemlQI Greenbeatt' s Memo in Opp to Costa aad iMI 
20 Plaintiffs' Verified Memo. Costs and Fees, pp. 4-5. 
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(2011)). "[I]n order for a transaction to be commercial, each party to the transaction must enter 
the transaction for a commercial purpose." Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 756, 
274 P.3d 1256, 1271 (2012). 
It is undisputed that the gravamen of this lawsuit was a dispute between Plaintiffs and 
Greenheart regarding the purchase and conveyance of sixty acres of land and the appurtenant 
water rights mistakenly transferred in the Warranty Deed. Plaintiffs rely on the following facts 
which support that this purchase and conveyance was a commercial transaction for purposes of 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3):21 Greenheart purchased the land because she wanted to invest in real 
estate in the Mountain Home Area. It is undisputed that since purchasing the land in 2007, 
Greenheart has never lived or resided on the land. Greenheart wanted vacant land with low taxes 
and low maintenance. Greenheart stated, "At the time of my purchase, I was very aware that my 
parcel is strictly for farming and that I had no way to build a residence." Greenheart wrote that 
"At the time of purchase, I was told that the land is dry and [the] grass that grows is good for 
cattle and there is no structure of any kind; therefore, the tax will be minimal." As the result of 
the efforts of Greenheart and Mr. Brown, the land was eventually classified by the Elmore 
County Board of Tax Equalization as dry grazing land. Greenheart drafted, and Mr. Brown 
signed, a dry grazing lease wherein the land which Greenheart bought was essentially leased 
back to Mr. Brown for the sole purpose of using it for dry grazing. Greenheart owned several 
other properties including a house in Japan, two properties in Alaska, two properties in Nevada, 
and another property in Emmett, Idaho. Further, Elmore County made an offer to Greenheart to 
purchase the land, but she declined to sell it at that time at the offered price but would consider 
selling in the future at a higher price. 
Greenheart argues the evidence in the record demonstrates that this case did not involve a 
commercial transaction.22 Specifically, Greenheart notes this Court found that "At the time of the 
sale, Idaho Code§§ 42-227 and 42-111 provided that no water right was necessary to operate a 
well for domestic purposes ... as a matter of law, there was an is a legal means to obtain a 
well."23 Greenheart contends to now find a "commercial transaction" was involved in this case 
21 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Directions for Entry of Judgment, pp. 4-5, ft 15, 17, 22; p. 12, ft 19, 
23-25. 
22 .See geneml~ Gmcnhean's Merna in Opp •a Co'*1 aaG »••• 
23 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Directions for Entry of Judgment, p. 16. 
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would contradict this Court's prior finding.24 Finally, Greenheart contends the purpose of the 
aforementioned dry grazing lease was solely to receive a reduction in taxes and not to receive 
any income, and Greenheart did not receive nor intend to receive any profit from the lease. 25 
Regarding this Court's comments on Idaho Code §§ 42-227 and 42-111, Greenheart's 
contentions are unavailing for two reasons. First, the simple statement that a well could be drilled 
and operated on the land for domestic purposes does not at all indicate the sale and conveyance 
of the land itself was for household or personal purposes. Second, a plain reading of the 
definition of "domestic purpose" or "domestic use" under Idaho Code § 42-111 includes many 
uses which are not necessarily residential or personal, including the use of land for farming, 
grazing, or any other use that does not exceed a specified diversion rate or volume. So the Court 
does not view "domestic" under the water statutes interchangeable with "household or personal" 
under the attorney's fees statute. 
Regarding the dry grazing lease, whether Greenheart received any income from the lease 
is not dispositive. What is important is what this Court can infer regarding Greenheart' s purpose 
for purchasing the land by in part considering what she did with the land after the purchase. The 
facts cited by the Plaintiffs indicates she was not using the land for residential or personal 
reasons and thus did not purchase the land for household or personal reasons. She bought the 
property as an investment, not for household or personal reasons. However, Ms. Greenheart's 
purpose alone is not dispositive. "[l)n order for a transaction to be commercial, each party to the 
transaction must enter the transaction for a commercial purpose." Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 
152 Idaho 741, 756, 274 P.3d 1256, 1271 (2012). 
There was no testimony at trial directly addressing the Plaintiff's purpose for listing the 
sixty acres for sale. The facts at trial were that the Browns had leased portions of their land's 
appurtenant water rights to the Idaho Water Resource Board since 2003 and derived rent from 
that lease. In 2006, Mr. Brown had contracted to sell 272 acres of the water rights to the Idaho 
Water Company and that contract was terminated after the sale of the sixty acres to Greenheart. 
Although the Browns had their residence on the 320 acre tract, they farmed and ranched on a 
portion of the land. Mr. Brown only listed sixty of their three-hundred twenty acres in this sale 
to Greenheart. The Browns subsequently sold or had a contract to sell any remaining water 
24 Gregmheart's Memo ju Opp tg Costs and fees, p 1 
25 Id., p. 3. 
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rights to the City of Mountain Home in 2012. The Browns had their residence on part of the 
three hundred twenty acres but not on the sixty acres sold to Greenheart. Several years after the 
sale to Greenheart, the Browns sold the rest of the land with the residence and moved their 
residence to another location. However, that residence was not marketed simultaneously with 
the property marketed and sold to the Defendant. In fact, the sale of the residence occurred a 
significant period of time after the 2007 sale of the land at issue in this dispute. While the 
Plaintiff focuses on the dry grazing lease, the testimony at trial related to the dry grazing lease 
was that Mr. Brown entered into the lease to be "neighborly" and assist Ms. Greenheart in 
obtaining an agricultural exemption but that transaction that occurred after the sale and was not 
contemplated in the sale. Although the purpose of the dry grazing lease with Greenheart was not 
a commercial purpose, this is not dispositive. In examining the overall purpose of the Plaintiffs 
in the facts at trial, they used the tract of land at issue in this case, its water rights, and the sale of 
the land for a commercial purpose ... to ranching, farming, and to derive income. The purpose of 
the sale of the sixty acre tract of land, when viewed in light of their other actions of leasing, 
contracting to sell, and selling other water rights, and later selling other portions of the land, was 
a commercial transaction. 
This case might turn differently if the land at issue was the land that contained the Brown 
residence. But it was not. The facts at trial were that this sixty acres at issue in this case were 
treated separately from the land with the residence. Therefore, it is this Court's determination 
that the Plaintiffs entered into the transaction for a commercial purpose. In so finding, the Court 
notes this decision is consistent with a line of authority going back nearly two decades in Idaho 
courts regarding similar transactions. 26 
26 See Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293, 306, 900 P.2d 201, 214 (CL App. 1995) (concluding the lease of real 
property constituted a commercial transaction where the land was purchased "for the purpose of operating a 
commercial cattle ranch" and where the purchaser "did not maintain a home on the ranch property"); and Watson v. 
Watson, 144 Idaho 214, 216, 219, 159 P.3d 851, 853, 856 (2007) (concluding the sale of real property constituted a 
commercial transaction where the land was purchased as a family retreat and "in large part for purposes of logging it 
and the district court was called upon to apportion the logging proceeds"); Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 439, 
80 P.3d 1031, 1040 (2003) (concluding the sale of real property constituted a commercial transaction where the land 
was purchased "for the purpose of Gamer establishing an elk ranch," but not mentioning any residence or home on 
the property even though the property description was a significant issue in the lawsuit); and Farm Credit Bank of 
Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 869 P.2d 1365 (1994) (concluding the sale of real property constituted a 
commercial transaction where "Stevenson and the Bank entered into a transaction to finance the purchase of real 
gmpcatY. wbjcb Stevenson intend"" to use gnd did, ns• fgg bit £QlRIRUGi1I RIARU.9 8)J8Nti8ft9,u agaht iWl 
mentioning the presence of any residence or home). 
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Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the sale of land between Plaintiffs and the 
Defendant was for commercial purposes under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). The Court also finds 
that this commercial transaction was the gravamen of this lawsuit. The Court concludes Idaho 
Code § 12-120(3) provides a basis for awarding Plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees in this 
action. The Court will not consider further bases for such an award of attorney's fees, including 
under Paragraph 9 of the Vacant Land Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
B. Whether Plaintiffs' claimed attorney's fees are reasonable under Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3). 
Plaintiffs contend that $58,413.50 is a reasonable attorney fee under Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(eX3).27 Under Rule 54(eX3), the Court must consider: (1) the time and labor 
required for this district court litigation all the way through trial and post-trial matters, (2) the 
novelty and difficulty of the questions, (3) the skill required for this type of litigation and the 
experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law, (4) the prevailing charges for 
like work, (5) whether the fee was fixed or contingent, (6) the time limitations imposed by the 
client or the circumstances of the case, (7) the amount involved and the results obtained, (8) the 
undesirability of the case, (9) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the 
client, (10) awards in similar cases, (11) the reasonable cost of automated legal research, and 
(12) any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case. Plaintiffs have 
submitted the Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak in part to help this Court make this necessary 
determination under Rule 54(eX3).28 The Court considered the affidavit in making the 
determinations for each factor below. 
This action was initiated by Plaintiffs on April 5, 2012. After discovery, the parties filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment. After the Court issued its decision on those motions, the 
matter was heard as a court trial on March 5 and 6, 2013. After trial, Plaintiffs filed this motion 
for fees and costs. Reviewing the record as a whole, this matter required slightly less time and 
labor than this Court sees in the typical civil cases that proceed through trial. The questions the 
parties addressed involved some frequently litigated issues, such as the merger of purchase and 
sale contracts into a subsequent deed, but also involved less frequently litigated issues in 
specialized areas of water law and real estate law, including the appurtenance of the water rights 
TT Plaintiffs' Verified Memo. Costs and Fees, pp. 3-6; Verified Notice of Errata and Withdrawal of Portion of 
Cairned Attorneys Fees 
28 Dvorak Aff. (5/31/2013), ft 9-18. 
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and the legal effect of a mutual mistake. Given this mix of simple issues with more complex 
issues, the skill required for this litigation is more specialized than this Court regularly sees in 
more general civil litigation cases, and the experience and ability of the attorneys in this case met 
that standard. 
Reviewing the billing rates and invoices set forth in the Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak, 
Mr. Dvorak billed hourly at a rate of $260.00 per hour in 2012 and $275 per hour in 2013. Mr. 
Creamer billed hourly at the rate of $270.00 in 2012 and $300.00 in 2013. The Court notes these 
amounts are higher than usually charged in the civil litigation cases by attorneys in this area. By 
"this area," the court is referring to Boise, Idaho. Although this litigation occurred in Elmore 
County, this Court is familiar with the attorneys and expertise in this area and finds that the 
prevailing rate for this geographic area includes the rates in Boise, Idaho, since many of those 
that litigate civil cases in this area actually travel from Boise. Even considering the specialized 
expertise and the higher prevailing rate for attorneys in the Boise area and who travel to outlying 
areas, the rates requested are higher than partners with similar experience in similarly-sized 
Boise law firms. The Court finds the average hourly rate in this geographic area, even for 
attorneys with acquired expertise and years of experience, is $250.00 per hour. Most firms did 
not increase billing rates in 2013 due to a still sluggish {although finally increasing) demand for 
legal services and glut of still unemployed lawyers in this geographic region. Therefore, this 
court finds the prevailing charges for similar specialized work that involves attorneys with an 
acquired expertise in the relevant areas of law is $250.00 per hour and finds this is a reasonable 
fee for the services of Mr. Creamer and Mr. Dvorak. The hourly rate for Mr. McLaughlin as 
billed is reasonable. The Court will reduce the fees requested accordingly. 
Therefore, the Court has recalculated Mr. Creamer's fees based on the 62.7 hours worked 
{the court did not include 6.9 hours for which the billing records indicate the client was not 
charged and did include the hourly reduction from the errata filed). The Court calculates a 
reasonable hourly fee for Mr. Creamer's services as $15,675.00. The Court has also recalculated 
Mr. Dvorak's fees based on the 104.8 hours worked. The Court calculates a reasonable hourly 
fee for Mr. Dvorak's services as $26,200.00. 
The hourly rate of Mr. Nelson of $175.00 for a paralegal is also higher than usually 
charged in that the prevailing charges for paralegal work in this geographic area. The prevailing 
char.ges for paralegal work are half tbe boud¥ i:ate Qf a&t&m•ysa Jlr;'eft wt~ ll g!:Cftt cleat of 
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experience and expertise.in an area that is ''paperwork" and research intensive such as real estate, 
the rate of $150.00 per hour is reasonable. Therefore, this court will reduce the requested fees 
for Mr. Nelson to that amount and award $870.00 for his services. The rate charged for Ms. 
Nicholas is a reasonable fee based on the above analysis. Although the court notes that these 
fees included Ms. Nicholas attending trial for two full days, the Court finds the attendance by the 
paralegal giving the number of documents, exhibits, and issues with technology in evidence 
presentation was reasonable. Mr. Dvorak was the only attorney at the trial and did not bring a 
string of associates to the trial of this case and the attendance and expertise of the paralegal at 
trial was reasonable. 
The billing rates, invoices, and testimony of Mr. Dvorak indicates Plaintiffs were billed 
on a fixed hourly rate basis throughout the case. From beginning to end, this case followed the 
same unremarkable time limitations of any other civil case - mainly the limitations placed on the 
parties by the applicable scheduling deadlines. No further time limitations were imposed by the 
parties. As Plaintiffs were seeking a declaratory judgment declaring their ownership of the at 
issue water rights, the "amount" involved or "amount" awarded is not pertinent. Instead, what is 
important to note is that Plaintiffs received the declaratory judgment they were seeking. As noted 
in the Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak, there was nothing undesirable about this case except for 
perhaps. the relative value of the water rights sought compared to the costs of taking the case 
through motions for summary judgment, trial, and perhaps an appeal. 
Regarding the nature and length of the relationship with the client, Mr. Dvorak testifies 
that his firm, Givens Pursley LLP, has provided legal advice and counsel to Plaintiffs for a 
number of years on various matters. Regarding the reasonable cost of automated legal research, 
the requested amount of $489.13 is reasonable for the research required on the legal issues in this 
case, both at summary judgment and at trial, which involved specialized areas of law. 
Based on this Court's determination of the pertinent factors, above, and the Court's 
review of the Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak, including each individual entry of the billing 
sheets submitted with that affidavit, the Court finds reasonable attorney's fees of $15,675.00 for 
Mr. Creamer, $26,200.00 for Mr. Dvorak, $1,850.00 for Mr. McLaughlin, $870.00 for Mr. 
Nelson, and $9,261.00 for Ms. Nicholas, and awards $489.13 as a reasonable cost for automated 
legal research. Thus, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for costs and fees to the extent it 
requests $53,856 00 in reasanahJe attome>(s foes and $489 13 fnr mttomated legal research 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for costs and fees to the extent of $973.05 in costs 
as a matter of right; $160.00 in discretionary costs; $53,856.00 in reasonable attorney's fees; and 
$489.13 for automated legal research. The Court makes a total award of fees and costs to the 
Plaintiffs of $55,478.18. 
SO ORDERED AND DATED THIS 61h day of August, 2013. 
L~ 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
JAY BROWN and CHRISTINE HOPSON-
BROWN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
AUGUSTA SA YOKO MIMOTO 
GREENHEART, an individual, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-353 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, based upon the Judgment 
filed May 23, 2013 and the Memorandum Decision and Order Granting In Part Plaintiff's Fees 
and Costs filed on August 6, 2013, that final judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiffs and 
against Defendant on all counts and claims for relief of the Complaint; and fees and costs of 
$55,478.18 are awarded to the Plaintiffs. 
IT IS SO ORDERED and DATED this 6th day of August, 2013. 
Lynn~ 
District Judge 




With respect to the issues determined by this judgment or order it is hereby CERTIFIED, 
in accordance with Rule 54(b ), I.R.C.P ., that the court has determined that there is no just reason 
for delay of the entry of a final judgment or order and that the court has and does hereby direct 
that the above order shall be a final judgment or order upon which execution may issue and an 
appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
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